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I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFERRAL
A. Introduction
This Article addresses the problem of when the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) should refrain from resolving unfair labor practice charges that have
been or could be resolved by contractual grievance and arbitration procedures. Re-
fraining, known as deferral, may be appropriate either before or after contractual
procedures have been used. I This Article articulates a general theory of deferral that
is essentially consistent with Board jurisprudence and, more importantly, with con-
gressional intent and national labor policy. It answers a number of arguments criti-
cizing Board deferral and also supplies much needed clarity to the Board's evolving
deferral policy. The Article places emphasis upon two recently decided cases, United
Technologies Corp.2 and Olin Corp.,3 and their progeny. Finally, the Article makes
two recommendations that would immediately advance NLRB deferral policy.
For fifty-two years the Board has enforced a statute whose purpose is to give
employees the right to determine how best to protect their interests. 4 The provisions
of the statute are designed to bring the parties to the bargaining table-union
representatives on behalf of employees and management representatives on behalf of
the employer. 5 Once there, the parties bilaterally determine the employment rights
and responsibilities that will govern their relationship. The protections for individual
employees included in the resulting employment contracts are typically broader than
those contained in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act). 6 The statutory
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School; B.A. 1967, Clark College; J.D.
1974, Northwestern University. The author is indebted to Roger Abrams, Peter Gerhart, Peter Junger, Doug Leslie, and
William Marshall for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article and to Cecil Marlowe, Mary Teresa Sobnosky, and
Robert Solomon for valuable research assistance. This Article was made possible bya grant from Case Western Reserve
University Law School.
I. In this Article restraint in the former context will be referred to as pre-settlement deferral and in the latter
context as post-settlement deferral.
2. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
3. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
4. See National Labor Relations Act § t, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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provisions protecting individuals are primarily limited to insuring employees the right
to act in concert and the right to determine the question of union representation in a
noncoercive atmosphere. 7 Predictably, the Board's major role under the Act is to
protect the rights of employees to decide the issue of union representation.8 Once that
decision has been made, the Board retains only the secondary role of protecting the
collective system that the parties have instituted. 9
The implications of this statutory design for deferral cases are subtle. Deferral
cases arise only after the parties have inaugurated a collective bargaining relationship
under which those covered by the agreement enjoy a panoply of rights and
responsibilities. 10 At this phase of the parties' relationship, the Board's primary task
of protecting the right of employees to decide the issue of representation has been
accomplished. All unfair labor practice charges that arose during the course of the
union campaign, including alleged unlawful coercion and discrimination against
individual union activists or opponents, have been disposed of.II The Board has also
decided questions concerning union representation itself by conducting an election
and resolving ancillary questions arising before or after the election.' 2 Finally, it has
enforced the procedural and substantive obligation to bargain in good faith.' 3 At this
point, the major purpose of collective bargaining is to protect employees and preserve
industrial peace. When collective bargaining is capable of resolving disputes that
have statutory ramifications, the Board is concerned only about conduct of the parties
that may threaten the employees' representation decision, the resulting collective
bargaining process, or its own effectiveness as an enforcing agency. 14 Deferral in
these instances is inapproriate either when the grievance-arbitration procedures
created by the parties cannot handle the dispute or when the alleged conduct or award
threatens the representation decision, the collective bargaining process, or the
Board's enforcement authority. In cases not involving these special concerns, Board
deferral permits collective bargaining to perform the role intended by Congress.
With only two statutory guidelines-the NLRB's enforcement mandate and the
preference for private adjustment provisions-the Board has steered a course that is
generally faithful to the statutory design and that also supports this general theory of
deferral.1 5 Essentially, the Board has deferred when grievance-arbitration procedures
could fairly resolve the unfair labor practice aspects of the dispute' 6 and has exercised
7. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
8. See infra notes 25-55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 82-147 and accompanying text.
16. The major exception was the Board's decision in General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
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jurisdiction when conduct by one or more parties threatened the employees' freedom
of choice or the collective bargaining process itself.' 7 The Board has exercised its
enforcement capability and has heard unfair labor practice complaints when the
parties' grievance procedures could not resolve the dispute.' 8 While occasionally
veering off course, the Board's policy announcements in United Technologies and
Olin Corp. and subsequent decisions have evidenced a new clarity of direction. This
lucidity is threatened only by the Board's apparent failure to fully appreciate the need
for a general theory of deferral.
A general theory would help the Board distinguish between cases implicating its
central focus and those requiring only supervision. With this understanding, the
Board would no longer misapply its deferral standards. 19 In addition, under a general
theory, pre-settlement and post-settlement cases would not present different prob-
lems. Rather, they would present one problem, resolved by a uniform set of
standards.20 This uniform application of deferral standards would lead to greater
consistency in deferral decisions. Finally, a general theory would help the Board
appreciate the importance of carefully scrutinizing the results of the grievance-
arbitration process. 2' Although current pre-settlement and post-settlement deferral
standards acknowledge the fair representation inquiry, the Board has given disturbing
signs that it does not recognize the importance of the fair representation test for
deferral. 22 Incorporating a "reasonable care" standard of representation into the
fairness standard of review under Spielberg Manufacturing Co.2 3 and Olin would
fortify the Board's progressive deferral policy against claims of abdication and seal
the connection between collective bargaining and Board deferral under our national
labor policy.2 4
B. NLRB and Contractual Grievance Procedures: A "Thumbnail" Sketch
1. Board Procedures25
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 193526 with major amend-
ments in 194727 and 1959.28 Its purpose is to encourage collective bargaining, while
protecting the freedom of employees to decide the issue of representation.2 9 The
17. See infra notes 307-61 and accompanying text.
18. See id.
19. See infra notes 362-76 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 377-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 396-429 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 400-05 and accompanying text.
23. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
24. See infra notes 406-29 and accompanying text.
25. See generally T. KA.%siOLZ & S. STRAuss, PRACTIcE AND PRoc.nuRE BEmRE THE NATIONAL ABOR RELATIONS BoARD
(3d ed. 1980); F. McCumoai & T. BoRNSTm, THE NAToIAL LABOR REAoTIo.NS BoARD (1974); K. McGutNEss & J. Nomius,
How To TAKE A CASE BEFoRE THE NLRB (5th ed. 1986).
26. National Labor Relations ('Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
28. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959). The health care amendments were added in 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
29. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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substantive rules of the Act further this objective by making certain types of employer
and union conduct unfair labor practices. 30
The Act, as amended, is enforced by the National Labor Relations Board, the
administrative agency charged with preventing and remedying unfair labor practices3'
and with deciding questions of representation. 32 These two functions of the Board are
performed by a five-member quasi-judicial body that adjudicates unfair labor practice
and representation cases, and a General Counsel who investigates and prosecutes
unfair labor practice charges. 33 The duties of the Board and General Counsel are
delegated to regional directors, who manage thirty-three regional offices throughout
the country. 34 Regional staffs of field examiners and field attorneys investigate
charges, prosecute unfair labor practice cases, conduct elections, hold representation
hearings, and write representation decisions. 35
Unfair labor practice cases are initiated when an employee, union, or employer
files a charge claiming that an employer or union has committed an unfair labor
practice. 36 Field examiners and attorneys investigate such charges, and the regional
director decides whether they have merit.37
If a charge has merit, the regional director, as the General Counsel's designee,
issues a complaint. 38 If the case is not settled, 39 a field attorney tries the case before
an administrative law judge (ALJ).40 While charging parties are permitted to
participate in unfair labor practice trials and may be represented by counsel, such
30. Section 8 provides as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . . (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization: . . . (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter, (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-- (I) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect
to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership; (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his
employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title; ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a), (d) (1982).
34. Telephone interview with Warren Bellamy, Compliance Officer for Region 8 of the NLRB, Cleveland, Ohio
(January 8, 1987).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982).
36. See 48 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1983).
37. See id. at 5-6.
38. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1986).
39. In 1983, the most recent year for which Board statistics are available, approximately 85% of the unfair labor
practice cases deemed by the regional director to have merit were formally or informally settled at the regional office level.
48 NLRB ANN. RaP. 7 (1983).
40. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.15, 102.34-.35 (1986).
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trials are prosecuted and fully controlled by the field attorney. Respondents are, of
course, accorded full due process rights. 41
If the ALJ's decision is not appealed to the NLRB, the NLRB will automatically
adopt the ALJ's decision. 42 If the ALJ's decision is appealed, a panel of three Board
members will affirm, reverse, or modify the ALJ's decision, 43 unless the importance
of the issue requires review by the entire five-member Board. 44 The NLRB's decision
must be enforced by a federal circuit court of appeals at the request of the Board and
may be reviewed pursuant to the petition of any "person aggrieved.' 45 The circuit
court's decision is appealable to the United States Supreme Court.
If a charge does not have merit, it is either withdrawn by the charging party or
dismissed by the regional director.46 Such dismissal decisions may be appealed only
to the Office of the General Counsel in Washington, D.C.47 where they are virtually
always affirmed. 48 The General Counsel's dismissal decision may not be ap-
pealed. 49
Representation cases also begin at the regional office level. Petitions are filed by
unions, employees, and employers claiming that a question of representation exists.5 0
Field attorneys and examiners investigate such petitions and the regional director
secures the agreement of the parties regarding jurisdictional or voter eligibility issues.
The regional director may also conduct a hearing on contested election issues and
direct an election if he finds that a question of representation exists. 5' Regional staff
may also conduct the elections and investigate post-election charges of objectionable
conduct.52 If the regional director finds that coercive or other conduct has affected the
election process, he will set aside the election and order a new one. Otherwise, the
election results stand. Because unfair labor practices often occur during organiza-
tional campaigns, objections arising in representation cases and unfair labor practice
issues may be consolidated for trial. 53 Regional director decisions in election cases
are reviewable by the NLRB.54 In the interest of expeditiously resolving represen-
tation questions, the Board's decisions in representation cases are not directly
appealable to circuit courts of appeals. Rather, these decisions may only be reviewed
on appeal in the context of unfair labor practice cases. 55
41. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1986).
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (1986).
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.45-.48 (1986).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982).
46. See 48 NLRB AN-;. RRE. 5-6 (1983).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1986).
48. See NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for Fiscal Year 1984, 1984 Labor Relations Yearbook
(BNA) 326.
49. The decision of the General Counsel may, however, be reconsidered. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1986).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), (c) (1982); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60, 102.62-.64 (1986).
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1986).
53. See J. FE.uc, H. BAR & J. AREA, NLRB REPREsENTATnoN ELEcnONs-LAw, PRAcncE & PROCEDURE, § 10.4
(1979).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1986).
55. See 29 U.S.C. 88 159(d), 160(f) (1982); but see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
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2. Contractual Grievance Procedures
Virtually all collective bargaining agreements contain a procedure for resolving
disputes arising under the agreement.5 6 Most grievance provisions are drafted in
broad terms, covering virtually all disputes that arise during the term of the
agreement.5 7 Generally, this grievance procedure permits a complaining employee or
the union to initiate a grievance with an immediate supervisor, often the person
implicated in the complaint. 58 If the grievance is not settled at this first stage, the
grievant may attempt to settle at progressively higher levels of management within
prescribed time periods. 59 If the parties cannot settle the grievance at one of these
higher steps, most agreements call for submission of the dispute to arbitration. 60 A
party who improperly resists an arbitration request may be compelled to arbitrate in
a breach of contract action. 6 1 Arbitration hearings are less formal than court
proceedings but do follow conventional trial procedures. 62 The contractual agree-
ments provide the decisional rules, and both parties have the right to present relevant
evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 63 The parties often file post-hearing briefs
that are used by the arbitrator in rendering an award. 64 The arbitrator's award
typically frames the issues, cites relevant contractual provisions, sets forth the factual
background of the case and the contentions of the parties, and discusses the
arbitrator's reasoning and conclusions. 65
Arbitrators are contractual creatures; their authority and awards are limited by
the contract. 66 Arbitration awards may only be enforced in a subsequent breach of
contract court action and not by the NLRB.67 While the Board may construe
collective bargaining agreements to determine whether unfair labor practices have
been committed, it has no jurisdiction to hear ordinary breach of contract cases. 6
Courts also exercise a narrow scope of review of arbitral awards, generally enforcing
them unless: (1) the arbitrator has exceeded contractual authority; (2) the award is
56. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1 (1987) [hereinafter CBNC].
57. See id.
58. See id. 51:2.
59. See id. 51:1.
60. See id. 51:5. See also F. EuLouju & E. ELouiu, How AsrrrAnox i Woes, 165-66 (4th ed. 1985).
Typically, the arbitrator is a single professional, not aligned with either party, and is selected by the parties from a
panel maintained by the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. See F.
EtcoURI & E. EtKoURI, supra, at 135-37. A noteworthy exception to this rule is the Teamsters Joint Committee, which
consists of an equal number of management and union representatives and no neutral party. See Miller, Teamster Joint
Committees: The Legal Equivalent of Arbitration, 37 PRoc. OF NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 118 (1984); Summers, Teamsters Joint
Grievance Committees: Grievance Disposal Without Adjudication, 37 NAT'r AcAn. ARD. 130, 133-35 (1984).
61. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for a federal breach of contract action to be brought in federal
district court. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Similar
actions may be brought in state courts, but federal law must be applied. Charles Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502
(1962).
62. See F. EtKouRI & E. E.KOURI, supra note 60, at 258-69; Haughton, Running the Hearing, in Armnn os IN
PRscncE 37, 39 (A. Zack ed. 1984) [hereinafter ZACK].
63. See ANERICAN ARBRATnoN AssoaAnoN: VoLuNrARY LAROR ARErIn1o. RuL.s 28 (1965); Jones, Selected
Problems of Procedure and Evidence, in ZAcK, supra note 62, at 48.
64. See F. EtCoURI & E. EtKouRi, supra note 60, at 273-76.
65. See, e.g., Kenner Products, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 572 (1982) (Abrams, Arb.).
66. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).




tainted by some fundamental defect, such as fraud; or (3) the award violates the law
or public policy. 69
Collective bargaining agreements typically create a range of rights and obliga-
tions relating to compensation, direction of the enterprise, hours of work, leave, and
the allocation of employment opportunities. 70 Importantly, they also provide for fair
treatment in the workplace. 7 1 Generally, all of these issues are subject to the
grievance procedure. 72 For example, an employee's complaint about a specific form
of unfairness proscribed by the Act, such as a demotion because of protected union
activity, could well be adjudicated under the grievance procedure as a demotion
without "just cause."
This comparative sketch of Board and contractual dispute settlement procedures
serves two purposes. First, it provides some basis for comparing outcomes when
cases are decided under each system. For example, in an arbitration hearing, like a
Board hearing, both parties will present evidence that will be scrutinized through
cross-examination. Thus, if the same issue were before both tribunals, there is a
substantial probability that the results would be similar. Second, it provides a general
reference for later discussions about the statutory implications of Board deferral to
contractual procedures and settlements. 73
C. Deferral Jurisprudence
1. How the Deferral Issue Arises
The NLRA empowers the Board "to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice" and specifically provides that "[t]his power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise." 74 A 1947 amendment to the Act,
however, gives preference to contractual procedures in the following terms: "Final
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."75
When a party charges that an employer or union has engaged in conduct that
both constitutes an unfair labor practice and is resolvable under a contractual
grievance procedure, a deferral issue is presented. The deferral decision is initially
made by the General Counsel. If the General Counsel decides to issue a complaint
notwithstanding a respondent's claim that grievance procedures or a settlement
69. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). See generally St.
Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MicH.
L. REv. 1137, 1150-60 (1977).
70. See CBNC, supra note 56, at 36-95.
71. See id. 51:1.
72. See id. 51:5.
73. See infra notes 82-147 and accompanying text.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
75. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
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should receive deference, the General Counsel may bear the burden of proving before
an ALJ and the Board that deferral is inappropriate.
A charge raising a deferral issue is generally filed in one of two contexts: (1)
after the grievance procedure has produced a settlement; or (2) before the parties have
achieved a settlement through the grievance procedure. 76 In the post-settlement
context the charging party files a charge in spite of the settlement produced by the
grievance procedure, usually an arbitral award. In the pre-settlement context the
charging party may have completely bypassed the grievance procedure or may have
simultaneously processed a grievance and filed a charge with the NLRB. Pre-
settlement deferral in the latter instance, when the parties concurrently process a
grievance and an unfair labor practice charge, has been relatively uncontroversial. In
Dubo Manufacturing Corp.,77 the Board decided that the purpose of the Act would
be effectuated if it deferred action on the complaint pending the completion of
arbitration. In that case, the union filed charges in part protesting the discharge of a
number of employees in violation of subsection 8(a)(3) of the Act. One week later,
the union successfully sued the employer in federal district court to compel arbitration
of the grievances. The Board subsequently held that the statutory preference for
contractual adjustment procedures made deferral appropriate. The Board noted that
arbitration was being utilized by the parties and was capable of settling the dispute. 78
Under the Dubo rationale, therefore, the Board regularly defers to a concurrent
grievance process.
Yet, the issues that have sparked the most concern involve the scope of NLRB
deferral when a party either files a charge despite the settlement produced by
grievance procedures 79 or bypasses these procedures altogether. 80 For more than four
decades, the Board has grappled with the problem of how to reconcile its enforcement
jurisdiction with the statutory preference for contractual adjustment procedures. 8 1
2. Key Cases
a. Post-Settlement Deferral
The evolution of the Board's deferral policy in post-settlement cases 82may best
be described by reference to the following paradigmatic fact pattern. 83 Assume that
a company and union enter a contract that prevents discharge without "just cause"
76. This Article does not address the question of deference in the rare case in which the parties use some method
other than arbitration (e.g., the courts) as the ultimate step in the grievance procedure. Such a procedure may raise
concerns different from those supporting deferral to grievance arbitration. See St. Antoine, supra note 69, at 1141-42.
77. 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
78. Id. at 432.
79. This type of case will be referred to as a "post-settlement" case.
80. Hereinafter, the term "pre-settlement" will refer only to cases in which the grievance procedure is unused and
will not refer to cases such as Dubo in which the procedures are in progress.
81. See Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
82. Most post-settlement cases involve an arbitration award and frequently the more narrow "post-arbitral" or
"post-award" reference is used. Yet the broader reference to "settlements" more accurately reflects the Board's practice
of treating awards and non-arbitral settlements identically. See infra text accompanying note 357.
83. Hereinafter referred to as the "poor work performance" example.
[Vol. 48:595
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and provides for binding arbitration at the request of either party as the ultimate step
in the grievance procedure. Assume further that an employee is discharged, allegedly
for poor work performance. The case is brought to arbitration where the employee
claims that her work performance has been satisfactory and her discharge was without
just cause and presents supporting evidence. She does not, however, raise a claim
concerning her union activity. The employer presents unrebutted evidence showing a
noncoercive, nonhostile union environment and the consistent treatment of poor work
performance cases. Without mentioning a possible unfair labor practice, the arbitrator
finds the discharge was for poor work performance and denies the grievance. The
disappointed employee then files an unfair labor practice charge against the employer
claiming the discharge was in retaliation for filing grievances-a statutorily protected
activity. 84
Board resolution of this and similar cases has historically been inconsistent. In
1955, the Board decided in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.85 that it would defer to
arbitration awards if "the proceedings appear[ed] to have been fair and regular, all
parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel [was] not
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. ' 86 The Board believed that
such deference would further "the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary
settlement of labor disputes." '87 Since this repugnancy standard did not require the
arbitrator to decide the issue as the Board would have, arbitrators were expected to
perform their traditional contractual function rather than act as administrative law
judges. In International Harvester Co., 88 the Board announced that arbitral awards
were repugnant only if "palpably wrong. "89
Yet Spielberg's "clearly repugnant" standard proved to be inherently imprecise
and led to deferral when the arbitral award did not contravene clearly articulated
Board law. 90 On the other hand, the Board did not defer in cases in which the
arbitrator arguably relied upon an impermissible ground 91 or reached a result contrary
to Board precedent.92 The Board also encountered judicial opposition to its
application of the "clearly repugnant" standard. 93
84. See United States Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 736 (1981); Hamilton Die Cast Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 949 (1981);
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982). For text of statute, see supra note 30.
85. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (involving a charge of discriminatory failure to reinstate four striking employees
pursuant to a strike settlement agreement).
86. Id. at 1082.
87. Id. The apparent presumption was that if the award were inconsistent with the Act, it would also be inconsistent
with the results statutorily anticipated from the collective bargaining process.
88. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962) (involving a company's refusal to discharge an employee who had failed to pay union
dues as required in the collective bargaining agreement).
89. Id. at 929.
90. See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
91. See, e.g., Douglas Aircraft Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 578 (1978).
92. See, e.g., Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
93. See, e.g., Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (deference to the original decision
should often be accorded since "[i]f the reasoning behind an award is susceptible of two interpretations, one permissible
and one impermissible, it is simply not true that the award was 'clearly repugnant' to the Act"); NLRB v. Pincus Bros.,
620 F.2d 367,374 (3d Cir. 1980) (adopting the language of DouglasAircraft and stating that in such a situation, upholding
an award "may arguably be characterized as not inconsistent with Board policy.").
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Under Spielberg, the Board would defer in the "poor work performance"
hypothetical. There is no evidence that the grievant was denied basic due process
rights or suffered other unfairness in the arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, the
parties had contractually agreed to be bound by the arbitration award, and the Act
does not frown upon employee discipline for legitimate business reasons. 94
Six years after Spielberg, in Monsanto Chemical Co.,95 and two years later in
Raytheon Co., 9 6 the Board altered the standard enunciated in Spielberg. These cases
asserted that deferral to an arbitration award is improper when the arbitrator has not
considered the unfair labor practice issue. In Monsanto, the arbitrator explicitly
refused to consider whether the employee's union activity played any part in his
discharge. The Board refused to defer to the award saying:
It manifestly could not encourage the voluntary settlement of disputes or effectuate the
policies and purposes of the Act to give binding effect in an unfair labor practice proceeding
to an arbitration award which does not purport to resolve the unfair labor practice issue
which was before the arbitrator and which is the very issue the Board is called upon to decide
in the proceeding before it. 97
The Board reached the same result in Raytheon, a case in which the parties
specifically limited the arbitrator to the contractual issue and presented evidence only
on that issue and not on the unfair labor practice issue. 98
In the "poor work performance" example, the evidence suggests that the
arbitrator did not consider whether the employee was discharged because of her union
activity. The employee did not raise a claim in arbitration concerning her union
activity. Although the employer presented evidence of a union-neutral environment,
the arbitrator denied the grievance based on poor work performance without
mentioning a possible unfair labor practice. Since the Raytheon-Monsanto require-
ment that the arbitrator consider the unfair labor practice issue has not been
established, the Board would not defer to the arbitration award and the employee
would secure a Board hearing.
After requiring that the arbitrator consider the unfair labor practice issue, from
1972 to 1984 the Board was unable to decide the extent of arbitral consideration that
should be devoted to the unfair labor practice issue in post-settlement deferral
decisions. This twelve-year period featured broad swings between strict requirements
that made deferral difficult to lenient requirements that greatly facilitated deferral. In
94. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
95. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
96. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
97. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961).
98. In Raytheon the Board implicitly adopted the test that it would make explicit 21 years later in Olin. See infra
notes 108-11. The Board disagreed about whether the arbitrator had been presented with the same legal issues and the
same facts that the Board had been asked to consider. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963). The majority
rejected the dissent's argument that the contractual and statutory issues were parallel and evidence relevant to the unfair
labor practice issue had been presented to and considered by the arbitrator. On this question the majority distinguished
International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), in which the arbitrator had considered the same legal issues and
the same facts as the Board and reached a result that was not palpably wrong, on the basis that the employer had violated
the contract by not discharging an employee pursuant to a valid union security agreement. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
883, 886 (1963).
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its Airco Industrial Gases decision99 the Board extended the Raytheon-Monsanto
requirement by holding that the arbitrator must consider the unfair labor practice
claim and that the arbitrator's award must reflect such consideration. t00 Furthermore,
in Yourga Trucking Inc.,I01 the Board assigned the burden of proving the scope of
arbitral consideration to the party seeking deferral. As a result, the Airco and Yourga
Trucking requirements combined to make deferral more difficult. For instance, the
employer seeking deferral in the "poor work performance" example cannot show
that the unfair labor practice was explicitly considered by the arbitrator, since the
award is silent on the issue. The employee would thus receive a trial de novo before
an AL.
In Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,o102 however, the Board moved to the
opposite extreme, virtually abandoning any oversight of the arbitration process. In
that case, the union withheld from the arbitrator evidence of unlawful employer
motivation in the lay off of two employees. The Board was concerned that such
conduct would encourage multiple litigation of the same issue and would frustrate the
contractual dispute settlement process. Adopting the rationale of the dissenting
opinions in Airco and Yourga Trucking, the Board held that in discipline and
discharge cases it would defer to an arbitrator's award, even if no evidence of the
unfair labor practice issue had been presented, except where unusual circumstances
are shown.' 0 3 The Board felt that a resisting party should be required to use
contractual grievance procedures in discipline and discharge cases. Electronic
Reproduction also shifted the burden of proof to the party seeking to have the Board
exercise jurisdiction. In the "poor work performance" hypothetical, therefore, the
grievant's failure to raise and support the unfair labor practice claim would not bar
deferral since the General Counsel would be unable to prove unusual circumstances.
99. 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
100. In Airco, the employee alleged a discriminatory discharge based on his grievance-filing activity. The arbitrator
had been presented with the stipulated issue of whether the employee's discharge violated a collective bargaining
agreement that contained a "just cause" provision and also prevented union-based discrimination. The evidence before
the arbitrator included the agreement, testimony relating to whether the employee's supervisor was "out to get" him, and
the results of a grievance filed by the employee the year before the hearing. The Board held that deferral was improper
because the "award gave no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the unfair labor practice issue." Id. at 677. The Board
distinguished Local 1522, Int'l Bhd. of Elee. Workers (Westem Elec. Co.), 180 N.L.R.B. 131 (1969), in which the
arbitrator had considered the unfair labor practice issue but did not have all the available evidence. Airco Indus. Gases,
195 N.L.R.B. 676, 676 n.3 (1972). Thus, Airco established that the factual record at arbitration need not be as complete
as the Board's record in order to warrant deferral. This refinement of Raytheon survives in the Olin requirement that the
arbitrator be presented generally with the facts relevant to deciding the unfair labor practice issue. See infra notes 108-11
and accompanying text.
The Airco extension, however, is inconsistent with a deferral policy favoring collective bargaining. The Board could
have refused deferral on the basis that the arbitrator had not been presented with enough evidence relating to the unfair
labor practice to properly resolve that aspect of the dispute.
101. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
102. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
103. Id. at 761-62.Examples of unusual circumstances are an arbitrator's expressed refusal to consider the unfair
labor practice issue or the parties' stipulation that the unfair labor practice issue should not be considered. Id. at 761, 762
& n.18.
The holding in Electronic Reproduction is tantamount to saying that the Board will not worry about whether the
unfair labor practice aspect of the dispute was decided, provided the parties had the opportunity to resolve the issue. Yet
the Board's obligation to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices does not permit it to completely ignore conduct that
raises statutory concerns. Instead the Board should keep a watchful eye upon the collective bargaining process, albeit from
a reasonable distance.
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In a move back to the Airco-Yourga Trucking rule, the Board held in Suburban
Motor Freight, Inc. 104 that it would not honor an arbitration award "unless the unfair
labor practice issue before the Board was both presented to and considered by the
arbitrator." '1 5 The Board agreed with scholarly and judicial criticism of Electronic
Reproduction as an "unwarranted extension of the Spielberg doctrine and an
impermissible delegation" of the Board's jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practice
issues. 10 6 The Board also returned to the Airco requirement that the award must
indicate that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue and the Yourga Trucking
assignment of the burden of proof to the party seeking Board deferral. 0 7 Thus, the
employee in the "poor work performance" hypothetical could once again secure a
trial de novo on her unfair labor practice claim.
The Board's most recent pronouncement on post-settlement deferral is contained
in Olin Corp., decided in 1984.10 8 Charting a course between the presumption
favoring deferral, created by the Electronic Reproduction rule, and the obstacles to
deferral erected by the Airco and Yourga Trucking decisions, the Board held that the
unfair labor practice issue need not be expressly considered by the arbitrator. 1 9
Instead, under Olin, it is sufficient that the statutory and contractual issues are
factually parallel and that the arbitrator has been presented generally with facts
relevant to resolving the statutory issue. The Board also clarified Spielberg's "clearly
repugnant" standard as requiring the extreme showing that the award not be
"susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act."1 0 Finally, the Board held
that the burden of proving the inadequate scope or clear repugnance of the award rests
with the party seeking a Board hearing."'
In the hypothetical case discussed above, the Board would probably defer under
the standards established by Olin. It is unlikely that the General Counsel could
104. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
105. Id. at 146-47.
106. Id. at 146 & n.5. See also Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977) (Board could not defer when
the record failed to show that the arbitration panel clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue); Schatzki, Majority Rule,
Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Ray.
897 (1975); Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201, 209-12
(1976).
107. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146-47 (1980).
After Suburban Motor Freight the Board in Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982),
refused to defer to an arbitrator's denial of a grievance involving a discharge. The employee had not mentioned the unfair
labor practice issue in the arbitration, except to furnish the arbitrator with a copy of the complaint. While noting the
absence of any evidence on the unfair labor practice issue, the arbitrator concluded that the employee had not been
discharged for union activity. Before the Board, the employee alleged a violation of § 8(a)(l).
Dissenting, Member Hunter articulated a two-step "adequate consideration" standard that would become the basis
for the Olin decision. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. According to Member Hunter, the unfair labor
practice issue has been adequately considered if "(1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice
issue, and (2) it appears from the record that the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the
unfair labor practice." Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 145 (1982) (Hunter, Mem.,
dissenting). The majority, however, seemed to ignore the first step, arguing that the facts of the case showed that
considering "relevant facts does not necessarily lead to consideration of the statutory issue." Id. at 138. But if the
contractual and statutory issues are indeed parallel in their protection of the employee, then facts relevant to the statutory
issue will assure adequate consideration.
108. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
109. Id. at 576-77.
110. Id. at 577.
111. Id. at 574.
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persuade the Board that the contractual and statutory issues are not parallel, since a
finding of "just cause" dismissal would be inconsistent with a discriminatory
discharge."t 2 Also, the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts necessary to
resolve the unfair labor practice issue and there was both a business justification for
the discharge and affirmative evidence of no unlawful discrimination.
The Board has easily resolved other post-settlement deferral issues. For
example, before Olin, the Board had consistently refused to defer in cases involving
both unlawful employer domination"t3 and retaliation for using Board procedures. 114
The Board has also deferred to pre-award settlements produced by the grievance
procedures.t15 The Spielberg and Olin standards are applied in these cases, just as
they are in cases involving arbitration awards. "1
6
b. Pre-Settlement Deferral
A different hypothetical is needed to illustrate the pre-settlement deferral
issue.1 7 Assume a collective bargaining agreement permits the employer to subcon-
tract unit work only "to meet an economic emergency and then only for the duration
of such emergency." The agreement also contains a provision preventing discipline
or discharge without "just cause" as well as a broad arbitration provision covering
all disputes regarding the "meaning, interpretation, and application" of the agree-
ment. During the term of the contract, the employer calculated that it could reduce
labor costs, lower the price of its product, and avoid losing its market share by
subcontracting a portion of the work performed by union employees. Furthermore,
assume the employer then subcontracts the work, the union files a charge with the
Board alleging a unilateral change in conditions of employment, and the union
steward, who has threatened to file a grievance over the subcontracting, is terminated
on the basis of an unauthorized absence from his work station. If the union bypasses
the grievance procedure in favor of filing charges claiming a unilateral change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining and a discriminatory discharge, the Board must
decide whether to exercise jurisdiction or to require the use of the contractual
grievance procedure.
Since the duty to bargain continues throughout the term of the agreement, the
Board has jurisdiction to decide whether alleged unilateral changes occurring during
the term of the agreement violate the duty to bargain. Is Traditionally, the Board has
112. See, e.g., Saucelito Ranch, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 282, 285-86 (1985). But a legitimate business reason, such
as poor work performance, may shield the employer from liability both under the contract and under the statute.
113. See Servair, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278 (1978), modified by Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.
1979) (adopting the decision of the ALJ who characterized the proscription against employer interference as a "principal
provision" assuring employees the exercise of free choice in the selection of their bargaining representative).
114. See Filmation Assocs. Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721 (1977) (noting that the prohibition against retaliation preserves
the integrity of the Board's processes by guaranteeing the right of employees to participate in its investigation procedures).
115. See Griffith-Hope Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 487 (1985); Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1984).
116. See Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 216-17 (1984).
117. As used here, "pre-settlement" replaces the more common reference to pre-arbitral deferral. The former term
is more inclusive and reflects the Board's practice of treating both arbitral awards and pre-arbitral settlements identically.
See infra text accompanying note 357.
118. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967). See also Peck, A Proposal to EndNLRB Deferral
to the Arbitration Process, 60 vsS. L. REv. 355, 368-87 (1985) (recommending that the duty to bargain during the term
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eschewed the role of policing the parties' contracts, preferring the more limited role
of determining whether the alleged conduct attempted to undermine the collective
bargaining process.' 19 Yet, the Board has not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction where
the grievance procedure appeared incapable of resolving the dispute. 120 After
approximately thirty years of deferring to grievance procedures, in Collyer Insulated
Wire12 ' the Board articulated a range of factors that determine the ability of grievance
procedures to resolve a dispute. These factors concern the stability of the bargaining
relationship, the suitability of collective bargaining to resolve a dispute, the
willingness of the parties to submit to a grievance procedure, and the absence of
hostility to employee statutory rights. 122 When the Board determines that the parties'
settlement procedures cannot fairly resolve a dispute involving statutory rights, it
should not defer. After Collyer, adversarial union and employee relations, 12
employer rejection of the collective bargaining process, 124 and employer refusal to
proceed with the grievance arbitration procedure'25 were deemed grounds for denying
deferral.
The decisions to defer in Collyer and many similar cases, although opposed as
an abdication of the Board's authority to decide unfair labor practice issues, 126 were
relatively easy. 127 In these cases, the employers' alleged unilateral changes typically
would violate subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act 128 only if such changes were deemed
contractually unauthorized. Thus, the statutory and contractual issues were coexten-
sive and the Board benefitted from knowing what the contract permitted. Since the
arbitrator was deemed to have "special skill and experience in deciding matters
arising under established bargaining relationships," 129 the Board routinely deferred.
of a collective bargaining agreement should only consist of a duty to follow the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure
and arguing that Board unfair labor practice proceedings should be stayed only when an arbitrator's interpretation of party
rights would help resolve the unfair labor practice issue).
119. See Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). In deferring to the parties' grievance-arbitration
procedure the Board said:
We are not, however, convinced that this series of unilateral decisions by the respondent was part of a conscious
campaign on its part to undermine the authority and prestige of the Union as the collective bargaining
representative of the respondent's employees or to evade the respondent's obligation to recognize and deal with
the Union as such representative.
Id. at 705. Accord McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930, 934 (1954) ("In these circumstances, we do not view
the action of the Respondent in reallocating the clerical work of some of the tool crib attendants in department 144 by
assigning it to factory clericals as a subversion or disparagement of the collective-bargaining process.").
120. See Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964) (exercising jurisdiction when the
employer's unilateral action was not covered by the grievance-arbitration procedure).
121. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
122. Id. at 842.
123. See Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972).
124. See Mountain State Constr. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1085 (1973); Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B.
461 (1972).
125. See Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742 (1974).
126. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 532-36 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, Mems., dissenting); Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 849 (1971) (Fanning, Mem., dissenting); Id. at 856 (Jenkins, Mem., dissenting).
127. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); American Oil Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 492 (1965);
Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109
N.L.R.B. 930 (1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694
(1943). In ConsolidatedAircraft, the Board also deferred a § 8(a)(3) complaint to the grievance-arbitration procedure. But
see Marlboro Cotton Mills, 53 N.L.R.B. 965 (1943) (refusing to defer a § 8(a)(3) complaint).
128. For text of the Act, see supra note 30.
129. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971).
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For example in the hypothetical case, the employer's subcontracting would violate
subsection 8(a)(5) only if it was not authorized by the contract. As the parties'
"contract reader," the arbitrator would decide whether the employer exceeded its
contractual authority.' 30 Collyer, therefore, would require deferral of the union's
allegation of unilateral changes.
Cases involving individual rights, such as the union steward's allegation of
discriminatory discharge, present distinct problems, and the Board has treated the
deferral question differently in such cases. In National Radio Co.,131 decided one
year after Collyer, the Board deferred a case involving the discharge of a union
president, allegedly in violation of subsection 8(a)(3) of the Act. The crucial question
for the Board was whether the grievance procedure could "resolve [the] dispute in a
manner consistent with the standards of Spielberg."132 Since the contract contained
a "just cause" provision, making a nonrepugnant arbitral decision possible, the
Board answered in the affirmative. 33
The National Radio majority made the following observation about accommo-
dating the role of private settlement with the Board's role of enforcing the statute:
Both [statutory and contractual] jurisdictions exist by virtue of congressional action, and our
duty to serve the objectives of Congress requires that we seek a rational accommodation
within that duality. We may not abdicate our statutory duty to prevent and remedy unfair
labor practices. Yet, once an exclusive agent has been chosen by employees to represent
them, we are charged with a duty fully to protect the structure of collective representation
and the freedom of the parties to establish and maintain an effective and productive
relationship. 134
The Board felt that the collective bargaining relationship would be strengthened by
"mutual reliance on contract procedures" and could be disrupted by unnecessary
Board intervention. 135
The dissent argued that pre-settlement deferral in individual rights cases
amounted to "a subcontracting to a private tribunal of the determination of rights
conferred and guaranteed solely by the statute.' ' 3 6 They argued that the reasons
justifying deferral in contract interpretation cases did not exist in cases involving
individual statutory rights. In their view, Congress made the Board, and not
arbitrators, responsible for determining violations of the Act.137
The National Radio rule fared well until the Board's landmark decision in
General American Transportation Corp. ' 38 Chairman Murphy, who joined the Board
after the Collyer and National Radio decisions, seized upon the distinction between
130. See St. Antoine, supra note 69, at 1140.
131. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
132. Id. at 531.
133. Id. As evidence of the capability of the grievance-arbitration process to deal with disputes involving unfair
labor practice issues, the Board noted the increased demand for arbitrators, the large percentage of arbitration cases
involving the "just cause" issue (nearly half), and the prevalence of contractual grievance-arbitration provisions.
134. Id. (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 532.
136. Id. at 533 (Fannings & Jenkins, Mems., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
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unfair labor practice cases alleging violations of the duty to bargain, which turn on
contract interpretation, and cases alleging violations of statutory provisions protecting
individuals. She held, in a pivotal concurrence, that deferral was appropriate in cases
involving contract interpretation but inappropriate in resolving issues of individual
protection under the statute. 139 After General American Transportation, the Board
would defer on the subcontracting issue in the hypothetical case, since the unfair
labor practice turns on whether the contract gave the employer the power to
subcontract under these circumstances.1 40 On the other hand, the Board would not
defer on the union steward's claim of unlawful discrimination. t 4t
United Technologies Corp., decided the same day as Olin, reiterated the crucial
Collyer concerns of bargaining stability and case suitability. 142 Moreover, the Board
extended the relevance of these factors to all cases raising issues under subsections
8(a)(1), (3), (5) and subsections 8(b)(1)(A), (2), (3) of the Act. 143 In addition, the
Board reaffirmed a "rule of reason," requiring it to exercise jurisdiction when the
parties' process appears incapable of fairly resolving the dispute and also to test the
adequacy of the process against the Spielberg standards of review. 44
The following paragraph capsulizes the Board's reasoning in United Technolo-
gies:
It is fundamental to the concept of collective bargaining that the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement are bound by the terms of their contract. Where an
employer and a union have voluntarily elected to create dispute resolution machinery
culminating in final and binding arbitration, it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act
for the Board to jump into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their
disputes through that machinery. For dispute resolution under the grievance-arbitration
process is as much a part of collective bargaining as the act of negotiating the contract. In
our view, the statutory purpose of encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
139. Id. at 813 (Murphy, Chr., concurring).
140. See, e.g., Robinson, 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
141. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977) (deferral was not permitted because the
charge involved individual rights).
142. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). The Board readopted the pre-arbitral deferral standards
of Collyer. As a result, the following circumstances weigh heavily in favor of deferral: (1) Whether the dispute arises
within the confines of a long and productive collective bargaining relationship; (2) the absence of a claim of employer
animosity to the employees' exercise of protected rights; (3) whether the parties' contract provides for arbitration in a
broad range of disputes; (4) whether the arbitration clause clearly encompasses the dispute at issue; (5) whether the
employer has asserted its willingness to utilize arbitration to resolve the dispute; and (6) whether the dispute is eminently
well-suited to resolution by arbitration. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971). The Board's citation,
however, of United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 (1972), in which the Board deferred even though the employer had
committed unfair labor practices in the case under consideration, may lessen the significance of the second factor.
143. For text of the Act, see supra note 30.
144. Under the "rule of reason" the Board will defer only if it reasonably believes the arbitration procedures would
resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with the criteria of Spielberg. Therefore, the Board will not defer in the
following cases:
[1] [Wihere the interests of the union which might be expected to represent the employee filing the unfair labor
practice charge are adverse to those of the employee; . . . [2] Where the respondent's conduct constitutes a
rejection of the principles of collective bargaining; . . . [3] Where, after deferral, the respondent has refused
to proceed to arbitration . ...
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984) (citing General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 817
(1977)).
[Vol. 48:595
1987] DEFERRAL TO GRIEVANCE-ARBITRATION
bargaining is ill-served by permitting the parties to ignore their agreement and to petition this
Board in the first instance for remedial relief.L
45
While endorsing the landmark Spielberg, Dubo, and Collyer decisions, Board
Member Zimmerman rejected the majority's extension of Collyer to cases arising
under subsections 8(a)(1), (3) and subsections 8(b)(1)(A), (2) as a "[needless
sacrifice of] basic safeguards for individual employee rights under the Act." 46
Instead, he adopted Chairman Murphy's approach in General American Transpor-
tation, holding deferral appropriate only where "disputes essentially involve the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement."1 47
c. Judicial and Scholarly Reaction
Before Olin and United Technologies, court decisions were generally supportive
of the Board's developing deferral policy. Several Supreme Court decisions sup-
ported the use of collective bargaining procedures to enforce statutory rights 48 and
circuit courts typically enforced deferral decisions as falling within the sound exercise
of administrative discretion. 149
Since the Board's pronouncements in Olin and United Technologies, however,
judicial and academic critics have argued that the articulated deferral rules are
145. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984).
146. Id. at 561 (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, (United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)), the Supreme Court promoted arbitration as a means of resolving disputes
arising under the parties' contract. See also William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 17 (1974)
(specifically approving the Collyer doctrine, stating that it harmonized the Board's enforcement jurisdiction with the
congressional preference for private adjustment procedures); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 242-49 (1970) (granting injunctive relief barring a union strike over an arbitrable grievance, despite the
anti-injunctive provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, due to a concern for encouraging the resolution of labor disputes
through arbitration procedures); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965) (holding that an
employee claiming a breach of contract by the employer must attempt contractual grievance and arbitration procedures,
and noting Congress' express approval of the "contract grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes
and stabilizing the 'common law' of the plant"); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-71 n.7 (1964)
(compelling the employer to arbitrate a jurisdictional dispute, even though only one of the two competing unions would
be party to the proceeding and even though representation questions reserved for the Board were intertwined and
predicating its decision in part on the Board's post-award deferral policy).
Support for this Article's interpretation of the Board's relationship to private settlement procedures is found in the
Court's observation that after the Vagner Act became law and labor unions became stronger, "congressional emphasis
shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative
techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes." Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 251 (1970).
149. In general, the circuit courts have deferred to Board arbitral decisions, unless the Board abused its discretion
in failing to adhere to established standards or by applying invalid standards. See NLRB v. Container Corp. of Am., 649
F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (approving the Board's refusal to defer in an individual rights case after GeneralAm. Transp.);
Locals 700, 743, 1746, International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975)
(affirming the Board's deferral of § 8(a)(3) and other individual rights charges to arbitration after National Radio); Local
Union No. 2188, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (approving Collyer but cautioning against uncritically
applying the pre-arbitral policy); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming the Board's decision
to defer the company's unilateral change claim against the union to the grievance-arbitration procedure). But see NLRB
v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 377 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J., concurring) (arguing that the Board's deferral
rules are not rules of discretion but rules of law; thus the Board lacks discretion in individual cases, and it is therefore
inappropriate to review deferral decisions under the "abuse of discretion" standard instead of the lower "legal error"
standard).
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inconsistent with the Act and its enforcement scheme.' 5 0 Citing various Supreme
Court holdings, they have argued that the statutory provisions protecting individual
employees should be enforced by the Board, a public agency, and not by private
contractual procedures. '5 ' The critics have concluded that by deferring to grievance-
arbitration procedures in cases involving individual rights, the Board abdicates its
enforcement obligation or, at the very least, the Board's deferral policy permits
arbitration without adequate oversight.' 52 Critics have also argued that grievance-
arbitration procedures are inherently incapable of resolving statutory issues in that
arbitration is less likely to produce a fair result due to its informality and lack of
procedural safeguards, 53 an arbitrator's authority as defined by the collective
bargaining agreement may not permit her to decide statutory issues,' 54 and the give
and take of collective bargaining may result in the sacrifice of individual rights to the
institutional interests of employers and unions.1 55
On the other hand, one influential critic has argued that the Board's deferral
policy does not go far enough.' 56 Since collective bargaining agreements waive many
statutory rights, in his opinion, the Board's deferral rules frequently permit too much
scrutiny of private settlement procedures.157 As the following theory suggests,
however, none of these criticisms will survive close scrutiny.15 8
150. For judicial criticism of Olin and United Technologies, see infra note 376. For scholarly commentary, see
Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the
NLRB, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 23 (1985); Gregory & Mak, Significant Decisions of the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board's
"Celebration" of the 50th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 CONN. L. REv. 7 (1985); Henkel & Kelly,
Deferral to Arbitration after Olin and United Technologies: Has the NLRB Gone Too Far?; 43 WAsH. & LEE L. Rev. 37
(1986); Levy, The Undimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 Rtrrcms L.J. 269 (1985); Mack &
Bernstein, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Demanding Role, 40 Aim. J. 33 (1985); Morris,
NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Avesome Responsibility, 7 INusS. RE.. L.J. 290 (1985);
Moses, Deferral to Arbitration in Individual Rights Cases: A Re.examination ofSpielberg, 51 TENN. L. REv. 187 (1984);
Peck, supra note 118; Ray, Individual Rights and NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: A Proposal, 28 B.C.L. Rev.
1 (1986); Shank, Deferral to Arbitration: Accomodation of Competing Statutory Policies, 2 HoFSmA L . L.J. 211 (1985);
Vause, The NLRB Policy on Deferral to Arbitration-Deference or Abdication?, 58 FLA. B.J. 461 (1984); Comment, The
National Labor Relations Board's Policy of Deferring to Arbitration. 13 FLA. ST. U.L. Rev. 1141 (1986).
151. See infra notes 207-45 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 274-91 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. The purpose of this Article is not to enter the debate about whether the Act should be scuttled in favor of some
other approach to ordering labor relations in our society. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Getman & Kohler, The Common Law. Labor Law,
and Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YAt.e L.J. 1415 (1983); Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor
Relations?, 92 YAte L.J. 1409 (1983). Nor is it to debate the impact of the Act and its interpretation by the Board and
courts on the social and political development of workers. See, e.g., Klare, The PubliclPrivate Distinction in Labor Law,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358 (1982); Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward A New Historiography of Collective Bargaining
Law, 4 INDus. RE.. L.J. 450 (1981); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 62 MNN. L. Rev. 265 (1978); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm inAmerican LaborLaw, 90 Ymle L.J. 1509
(1981). Rather, the reality of the Act, as interpreted by the Board and the courts, is taken as a given. The purpose of this
Article is to suggest a theory that will help both the Board and the courts in resolving the thorny problem of defining the
relationship between Board jurisdiction and private settlement procedures.
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II. A GENERAL THEORY OF DEFERRAL
A. Key Elements
Only through an appreciation of the interrelated purposes of the Wagner,
Taft-Hartley, and Landrum-Griffin Acts can the proper relationship between the
Board's jurisdiction and grievance procedures be fully understood. ' 59 The basis for
such an understanding is found in the legislative history. The congressional design is
also revealed in judicial and scholarly interpretation of the Act's key provisions, as
well as in the modem reality of collective bargaining.
1. Legislative History
The Seventy-fourth Congress inaugurated collective bargaining as an answer to
the industrial strife that had characterized early twentieth century America. t60
Collective bargaining was intended to give workers a voice in determining their
working conditions, to raise a standard of living that had been shattered by the
Depression, and to protect employees from injustice in the workplace.' 6' To
accomplish these representational, economic, and equitable purposes, Congress
granted employees organizational rights and protected them from coercion and
interference by hostile employers. 62 Professors Cox, Bok, and Gorman explained
these goals as follows:
The Wagner Act was concerned primarily with the organizational phases of labor
relations. The aim was to prevent practices which interfered with the growth of labor unions
159. The centerpiece of the grievance procedure is arbitration. Since deferral policy looks to pre-arbitral settlements
as well as arbitral awards, the broader reference has been used.
160. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) which states the following:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
For a detailed account of this pre-Act industrial strife, see I. BENSTrEN, A HISTORY OF THE A.%iEcAN WoiRKER 1933-1941:
TURBI.RNT YEARs 217-317 (1970).
161. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), which states the following:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rate and working conditions within and between industries.
See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act and stating, "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of
employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in
itself does not attempt to compel."); Statement by Senator Robert F. Wagner (May 15, 1935), reprinted in NLRB, 2
LIs.LASvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR EI..ro.ms ACT, 1935 at 2321 (1985) (characterizing the Bill as intended to rescue
the isolated worker "'[claught in the labyrinth of modem industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise"
by assuring him dignity and freedom through "cooperation with others of his group"); H. RE'. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1935), reprinted in NLRB, 2 LEOtsLAnvE HISTORY OF THE NATONAL LABOR E.ATiONs Act, 1935 at 2915 (1985)
(emphasizing the legislative intent to "remove certain important sources of industrial unrest engendered, first, by the
denial of the right of employees to organize and by the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining, and second, by failure to adjust wages, hours, and working conditions . . . ").
162. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982). For text of these sections of the Act,
see supra notes 7, 30.
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and the development of collective bargaining. Once the union was organized and the
employer accorded it recognition as the representative of his employees, the function of the
statute, as originally conceived, was completed. 63
Under the Wagner Act, the NLRB's function was to preserve the organizational rights
of employees by preventing employer practices that diminished such rights. 164
While the Taft-Hartley Act put some restraints on unions, it did not change the
fundamental concept of collective bargaining or the role of the Board in protecting
employee free choice. On the contrary, the Taft-Hartley Act added provisions to the
NLRA that emphasized the role of collective bargaining in resolving employment
disputes. For instance, one provision contained an explicit statutory preference for the
voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes, 165 while another expressly affirmed
private dispute settlement as the preferred method for settling grievances arising
under collective bargaining agreements. 166
The Landrum-Griffin Act created yet another layer of union regulation, designed
primarily to protect individuals and minority groups within the union. 67 Even though
these amendments emphasized individual rights, such rights were not intended to
displace the primary role of the union representative or the institution of collective
bargaining in protecting the interests of employees.1 68 Rather, the amendments made
the unions more accountable to their constituencies. In this way the individual was to
enjoy greater protection through the collective bargaining process. 169 Significantly,
Congress chose the courts and not the Board as the vehicle to enforce the individual
rights granted union members by the Landrum-Griffin Act.170
The congressional scheme that emerges from this legislative history asserts the
primacy of collective bargaining to national labor relations policy while assigning the
163. A. Cox, D. BoK, & R. GosAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 85 (10th ed. 1986).
164. See Statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner, supra note 161, at 1414-25 (Subsections 8(a)(l)-(3) of the Act
were designed to protect employees from coercion or interference in the exercise of their organizational rights; § 8(a)(4)
was designed to help the Board carry out its enforcement function, and § 8(a)(5) was to give effect to the employees'
collective bargaining rights by requiring the employer to reciprocate).
165. See National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1982), which states the
following:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph
(4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out
of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has
been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or
agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute
with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
166. See National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982), which states the
following:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement. The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement
of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
See also Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970) (characterizing the Taft-Hartley
Act as a shift in emphasis from protecting the "nascent labor movement" to encouraging bargaining and peaceful dispute
resolution).
167. See National Labor Relations (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
168. See National Labor Relations (Landrum-Griffin) Act § 2(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a), (b) (1982).
169. See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HArv. L. R.v. 851
(1960); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HA~v. L. REv. 609 (1959).
170. See National Labor Relations (Landrum-Griffin) Act §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982).
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Board the principal task of assuring employees the freedom to choose collective
bargaining as a means of protecting their vital employment interests. 17 '
2. Policy Interpretation
True to Congress' conception of collective bargaining and the role of exclusive
representation, unions have been permitted to waive the statutory rights of individual
employees in order to obtain greater collective benefits. This "waiver doctrine," as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, reveals valuable insights about the intended
relationship under the Act between the individual and the collective. 172 In Metropol-
itan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 173 the Court noted that unions can waive individual as well
as collective statutory rights in order to secure gains they consider to be more
valuable, provided the union meets its duty to fairly represent its members. 174 Under
the waiver doctrine, unions are entrusted with and are expected to exercise
considerable discretion in protecting the rights of individual employees. Waivers,
therefore, are simply a way of permitting unions to serve their statutory purpose. 175
But waivers of individual rights are premised on two assumptions: that the union
fairly represents the members of the collective bargaining unit and that unit
employees freely choose their collective bargaining representative. 176 When these
two assumptions are not well-founded, collective bargaining's theoretical underpin-
nings collapse. Thus, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Magnavox Co. 177 said that
171. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98
HAav. L. Rrv. 351 (1984). For an historical account of the Board's central role in resolving representation disputes, see
I. BEumsls, supra, note 160, at 172-216.
172. For a valiant effort to formulate a comprehensive nonwaiver principle, see Harper, Union Waiver of Employee
Rights Under the NLRA: Part 1, 4 lrMus. REL. L.J. 335 (1981).
173. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
174. Id. at 705-06. See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), in which the Court stated:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through
a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective
means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore
extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power
vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees. "Congress has seen fit to clothe the
bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and
restrict the rights of those whom it represents .... 'Thus, only the union may contract the employee's terms
and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away
his right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The employee
may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them. "The majority-rule concept is today
unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy."
Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted).
175. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,
280 (1955).
This Article does not argue that collective bargaining agreements, through their general provisions, waive the
individual statutory rights of bargaining unit employees. The "clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement of
Metropolitan Edison is inconsistent with such a position. Cf. Edwards, supra note 150. Rather, the waiver doctrine
reflects a statutory design that contemplates: (1) the competency of the union to protect individual rights; (2) a primary
role for the union in protecting those rights; and (3) a reduced role for the Board in protecting individual rights after the
collective bargaining agreement has been executed.
176. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963)
(describing the test for valid contractual waivers as follows:"The validity of a contractual waiver of employee rights must
depend, however, upon whether the interference with the employees' statutory rights is so great as to override any
legitimate reasons for upholding the waiver.").
177. 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
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employee rights relating to the "selection, retention, or displacement of the
collective-bargaining agent" could not be waived and, therefore, held that a union
could not waive the statutory right of employees to distribute representational
literature on the employer's premises. 178 In that case, a distinction between dissidents
and union supporters could easily have been justified by the view that the union
would adequately protect the interests of supporters, but the Court went even further
by holding that even the distributional rights of pro-union employees could not be
waived by the union. 179 Thus, the majority stressed the importance of representation
questions under the Act.
The union's role as the protector of employee interests cannot be properly
fulfilled unless the union is freely selected and retained; employees must retain the
right to change representatives. '8 0 Thus, the Board's principal function is to preserve
this freedom of choice for employees. 181
3. The Collective Bargaining Experience
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act reveals that Congress'
confidence in collective bargaining has been justified. First, the essence of collective
bargaining has become the bilateral determination of wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment.' 82 It is also common for the parties to negotiate
collectively about matters relating to the scope and direction of the enterprise.
183
Second, the earnings of organized workers in many private sector industries have
historically outpaced those of similarly situated unorganized workers. 184 Third, due
to contractual grievance provisions, organized workers enjoy broad protection from
employment injustice. 185 In the words of Professor Feller: "The [collective bargain-
178. Id. at 329 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 324-27. See Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972) (in which the Board similarly extended this
prohibition against waiver of distributional rights to union supporters); cf. Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
180. But see RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982) (extolling the stability of collective bargaining
relationships and employee free choice as complementary policies best accommodated by requiring employers to continue
negotiating with an incumbent union, even when a rival has filed a petition for an election).
181. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 327-32 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
182. See Gould, Fifty Years Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Retrospective View, 37 LAD. L.J. 235
(1986); Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. L.J. 595
(1986).
183. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (bargaining on such subjects is
permissible but the union's ability to use economic pressure to support its bargaining position is limited); CBNC, supra
note 56, at 65:1-183 (management rights in traditional areas of managerial sovereignty, such as managing the business,
introducing technological changes in the organization of production, and relocating facilities, may be preserved or limited
by collective bargaining).
The new cooperative trend in labor-management relations has increased the importance of party discussions on
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining. See T. Koc-'n, H. KA'rz, & R. McKEestE, THE TRANsr-opAlsmox or AmERCAN
INDusrnuA Rm.A'ioNs, 179-205 (1986); Gould, supra note 182; Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 182.
184. See R. FRtEstAN & J. MEnoDF, \vnAr Do UNIONs Do?, 43-60, 78-93 (1984); A. REEs, THE Eco.-o.%ucs or TRADE
UNIONs 65-93 (1977); L. REvoLss, LABOR EcoNowcs AND LABOR ELAIONS 567-82 (6th ed. 1974); Campbell, Labor Lau,
and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1004-06 (1986); Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. Rev. 353 (1984).
Yet recent surveys suggest a trend that would ultimately close the gap between unionized and nonunionized workers.
Nonunionized workers in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms have recently received larger increases than
unionized workers. See, e.g., Nonunion/Union Wage Increase Prediction, 123 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 146 (October 20,
1986).
185. See R. FRE.IAN & J. MEoOF, supra note 184, at 94-110 (the union voice improves the workplace, primarily
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ing] agreement's most significant function is to provide a system for the adjudication,
at the instance of an aggrieved employee, of complaints that management, in
exercising its power to direct the work force, has not complied with the rules jointly
agreed to."1 86 Fourth, the majority of the Board's cases involving employer coercion
and interference with employee rights have dealt with conduct that occurred before
the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement.' 87 Thus, experience
teaches that the Board's major concern is pre-agreement misconduct, designed to
forestall, rather than destroy, the protective regime of collective bargaining.
B. The Theory
Against this backdrop of the congressional design of the Act and the experience
of collective bargaining, a practical guide to deferral begins to emerge. These
practical guidelines essentially provide a general theory of deferral that will further
national labor policy as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act as well as
provide a structured analysis of when the Board should exercise its decision-making
authority and when it should defer.
The first instance in which the Board should decide the issue, rather than defer,
arises from the Board's task of protecting the workers' right to organize, which is the
Board's primary duty under the Act. Additionally, as evidenced by its critical
jurisdiction in representation cases, the Board also has the primary responsibility for
defining the structure of collective bargaining. In fact, before agreements are in
place, the Board is the only body available to resolve questions of representation. As
the Supreme Court noted in Magnavox, after agreements are in place, the union's role
as representative may be inconsistent with the resolution of basic representational
issues through collective bargaining. 88 Thus, deferring representation questions
would be inconsistent with the Board's responsibility in this area. In the context of
through the grievance procedure, thereby reducing turnover and increasing tenure); A. RErs, supra note 184, at 26
(suggesting unfair and arbitrary treatment as a primary reason motivating workers to join unions); Campbell, supra note
184, at 1004-10 (explaining that only collectively can employees attain certain goods); Leslie, supra note 184 at 356-58
(describing a grievance procedure as a collective good whose costs would be prohibitive in the context of individual
bargaining as well as the function of the grievance procedure in protecting the inframarginal employee).
See also D. BoK & J. DutNop, Lksor AND THE ARIcAN Co.rt~uNrr 465 (1970) in which it is stated:
Unions have made what is perhaps their greatest contribution in securing fairer treatment for their members at
the workplace. In particular, they have made enormous strides to eliminate error, malice, favoritism, and other
human failings in the dismissal, discipline, promotion, and preferment of employees. By doing so, they have
also encouraged countless nonunion firms to make comparable reforms in order to counter the threat of
organization . . . .[F]ew knowledgeable observers would suppose that government tribunals would match the
flexibility and competence already achieved through the system of private arbitration established by collective
bargaining.
186. Feller, A General Theory ofthe Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAUF. L. REv. 663, 742 (1973). See also
I. BRNm, supra note 160, at 775-76, 789.
187. A survey conducted by Ms. Cecil Marlowe of unfair labor practice cases reported between 1979 and 1983
indicates that only 38.5% of the 4557 cases involved post-agreement § 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2) misconduct.
Of the reported 1983 cases involving employer misconduct, 63% were pre-agreement cases. A copy of the survey is on
file with the Ohio State Law Journal. See also Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1780-81 (1983) (a majority of workers discriminatorily discharged in 1980 were
discharged during representational campaigns).
188. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974).
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unit determination, for example, not only do Board-determined bargaining units 189
establish voting districts for targeted employees, but they also define the bargaining
rights and responsibilities of employers and unions. It is axiomatic that collective
bargaining cannot effectively fulfill its mission of securing economic and other
benefits for employees unless bargaining units are well-suited to furthering the
interests of covered employees. Because one of the Board's principal roles in
implementing national labor policy is to create these necessary preconditions for
collective bargaining, 90 this list of nondeferrable Board functions necessarily
includes decisions regarding representation disputes.
Closely associated with representation questions are issues involving employer
domination and assistance. Like the representation issue, the employer domination
issue should also be decided by the Board. Subsection 8(a)(2) of the Act' 9 1 grew out
of a concern that employers could defeat the organizational aspirations of their
employees by establishing company unions or more subtly influencing the affairs of
labor organizations. 192 Thus, the Board has regarded subsection 8(a)(2) as the
"principal provision" for assuring employee free choice in the selection of a
collective bargaining representative. 193 As a result of this link between subsection
8(a)(2) and the issue of representation, the employer domination cases present the
second context in which the Board should not defer.
Because the Board must be capable of performing its primary function of
protecting the rights of employees to decide freely the representational question, and
because it retains a supervisory function in other cases, the Board should maximize
its own enforcement capability. Indeed, it would be improper for this public agency
to rely upon private parties to protect its ability to handle representation and other
questions. Subsections 8(a)(4) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act' 94 arm the Board with the
necessary capability to defend this basic jurisdiction. Thus, deferral in such cases is
both unnecessary and improper.
The fourth instance in which the Board should not defer is when an unfair labor
practice threatens the collective bargaining process. The statute explicitly encourages
collective bargaining as providing the most effective forum for employee concerns.195
Under the statutory structure, the Board, as guardian, is to "oversee and referee" the
collective bargaining process. 196 Thus, the Board should not defer when an alleged
unfair labor practice threatens that process. One example of such an unfair labor
practice is an employer's refusal to supply information relevant to the union's per-
189. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982) (specifically charging the Board with
making unit determinations). See also I. BEsj4sTse, supra note 160, at 329 (concerns about potential employer and union
abuses led to giving the Board, rather than the parties, this authority).
On the importance of units to the bargaining process, see generally J. AsoDEaY, THE NLRB AND THE A'rsorasu,
BwoAtNNo Urnr (rev. ed. 1981); Leslie, supra note 184.
190. See National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
191. For text, see supra note 30.
192. See I. BERNSrsm, supra note 160, at 172-97, 319-20, 332-33.
193. Servair, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 1278 (1978), modified by Servair Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 607 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1979).
194. For text, see supra note 30.
195. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
196. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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formance of its collective bargaining obligation. According to this general deferral
theory, the Board should decide this case rather than defer. Collective bargaining in
general and grievance arbitration in particular simply cannot work unless the parties
are fully informed about the issues. 197
Finally, the Board must remain responsible for preventing and remedying unfair
labor practices. ' 98 Because a properly conceived deferral theory must both encourage
collective bargaining and prevent unfair labor practices, the Board must resolve
disputes involving unfair labor practices when the parties' grievance procedure
cannot adequately resolve such disputes.
In summary, a proper deferral policy would preserve the Board's primary role.
in assuring employee freedom of choice and would permit deferral only when
conditions allow collective bargaining to accomplish its statutory purpose. The
Board should not defer when the central focus of its jurisdiction is implicated, namely
cases involving representation issues under sections 9 and 8(a)(2) of the Act' 99 and
cases in which party conduct threatens the Board's effectiveness. 200 Furthermore, as
supervisor of the collective bargaining regime, the Board may not defer in cases in
which party conduct threatens the collective bargaining process itself2o0 and cases in
which a fair collective bargaining solution is unlikely or undemonstrated. 202
Deferral may be appropriate in all other cases arising under subsections 8(a)(1),
8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 8(b)(l),20 3 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3) of the Act. In cases in which the
197. See Wellman Thermal Sys., 269 N.L.R.B. 162 (1984); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967);
NLRB v. Truitt, 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Regarding the role of information exchange in collective bargaining, see C.
STEVE 1s, ST ATEGY ANo Cou.EcnvE BARGAING NEGOUtATONS 21-22 (1963). R. WALTON & R. Mclessm, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
or LAnoR NEOTIATIONS 140-41 (1965).
198. See National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
199. Examples include whether an employer's newly acquired plant constitutes an accretion to the existing unit and
whether an employer unlawfully dominated or assisted a labor organization.
200. For instance, alleged employer or union retaliation for filing unfair labor practice charges.
201. Such as when an employer repudiates key provisions of a collective bargaining agreement or initiates broad
scale unilateral changes in the workplace.
202. For example, cases in which the contractual dispute is narrower than the unfair labor practice issue, both the
employer and the union have interests adverse to the grievant's, or the quality of the union's representation of the grievant
falls below minimum standards.
203. Although the Board in United Technologies does not list § 8(b)(1)(B) among the statutory provisions that might
be deferred to the grievance procedure, the theory enunciated here suggests that such cases should be deferred where
appropriate. For the text of § 8(b)(1)(B), see supra note 30.
Typically, § 8(b)(1)(B) cases involve union actions against supervisors who are union members and have engaged
in conduct deemed detrimental to the union. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974)
(upholding the union's right to fine supervisory members who crossed a picket line during a strike to do rank and file
work). But see American Broadcasting Co. v. Writers Guild of Am. W., 437 U.S. 411 (1978) (upholding the Board's
finding that the union violated § 8(b)(l)(B) by fining supervisory members who crossed the picket line during a strike to
do supervisory rather than rank and file work).
Since many of these cases involve the exertion of eeonomic power to reach a contract settlement, deferral questions
are not usually raised. Subsection 8(b)(1)(B) issues, however, may arise during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement. In this context, as in other deferral cases, the question is whether there is a reason not to defer, such as the
destructive nature of a party's conduct or the improbable or undemonstrated fairness of a collective bargaining solution.
When no such reason is shown, the Board should defer.
The Board's decision in IBEW Local 1316 (Superior Contractors Assocs., Inc.), 271 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984) (adopting
the ALJ's holding that § 8(b)(1)(B) cases may be deferred to arbitration), suggests that the Board will follow this
reasoning. See also Warehouse Union Local 6, 210 N.L.R.B. 666 (1974); Columbia Typographical Union 101, 207
N.L.R.B. 831 (1973); Mailers Union 36, 199 N.L.R.B. 804 (1972). The Superior Contractors case suggests, without
good reason, that a stricter test of contractual scope should be applied in § 8(b)(1)(B) cases. There, the union fined a
supervisor for exercising his supervisory duties in a way that was "contrary to a member's responsibility" toward the
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parties' collective bargaining relationship is stable, the parties are willing to use their
grievance-arbitration procedure, and the contract is broad enough to resolve the entire
dispute, including unfair labor practice aspects, the Board should insist that the
grievance-arbitration procedure run its course. Furthermore, if the procedure has
produced a settlement that is consistent with national labor policy, the Board should
again defer, provided the procedures have been fair and the contract was broad
enough to generate evidence necessary to resolve the unfair labor practice
issue. 204
This general theory also asserts that in this second category of cases the burden
of proof should be borne by the party seeking a de novo hearing before the Board.
The burden of proof, of course, is not policy neutral in the deferral context. The
Board's use of the burden of proof to advance firmly rooted statutory policy is
grounded in well-settled procedural policy. 20 5 Leading commentators have recog-
nized that the proof burden is a handicap that often must be borne by those pressing
disfavored claims. 20 6 Under the burden of proof scheme espoused by this Article, if
the General Counsel decides to issue a complaint despite collectively bargained
contractual procedures, it is appropriate that she be required to prove the impropriety
of any deferral under the Act's pro-collective bargaining policy.
This theory recognizes the Board's enforcement role and suggests that the deferral
issue, whether it arises before or after a contractual settlement, is a single problem
requiring a uniform approach. Understood correctly, a general theory of deferral is
applicable in both pre-settlement and post-settlement cases. The theory also recognizes
that in its supervisory role, the Board must intervene when the grievance procedure's
capacity for fair resolution is either unlikely or undemonstrated.
C. Criticial Arguments Evaluated
1. Statutory Rights Require Public Enforcement
Relying on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,2 7 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.,208 and McDonald v. City of West Branch,2° 9 erstwhile and
current critics of Board deferral argue that the rights created under the NLRA may
only be enforced by the Board, the statutorily created public enforcement
agency. 21OLest important public rights be sacrificed, they say, private dispute
union. The AL refused to defer because the "agreement . . . contain[ed] nothing dealing with the propriety or
impropriety of union fines as applied to supervisors." 1BEV Local 1316, 271 N.L.R.B. 338, 341 (1984). Since
arbitrators may recognize such union actions as a violation of management rights under an agreement, no such narrow
provisions need be present to justify deferral under United Technologies. See, e.g., Utility Bd. of City of Key Vest, 78
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 39, 41-42 (1982) (in upholding the employer's selection of a supervisor outside the seniority system,
the arbitrator cited the general principle "that management has the right to select supervisors and this right of selection
is an incident of management's right to run its business"); F. Etxoui & E. Etxouia, supra note 60, at 581-85.
204. "Fairness" in this context refers both to due process and to a reasonably effective quality of representation.
205. See F. JAMsi & G. HAZARD, Ctva. PRocmtum, § 7.8 at 324-25 (3d ed. 1985).
206. Id. (citing C. CLARK, ConE Pt.Eaoo 609-10 (2d ed. 1947)).
207. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
208. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
209. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
210. See Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 765 (1984) (Fanning & Jenkins, Meres.,
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adjustment must not preclude Board determination of unfair labor practice issues.
This position has been endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
used the above cases as the basis for rejecting Olin.211 Significant attention,
therefore, must be given to these cases.
Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald addressed the issue of whether prior
arbitration awards should be given preclusive effect in subsequent actions brought
under Title VII,212 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 21 3 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.214
The Supreme Court held that Congress intended these statutory provisions "to be
judicially enforceable ... and that [arbitration] can not provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitu-
tional rights that [they are] designed to safeguard.' '215
In none of the cases, however, did the Court suggest that a similar congressional
intent underlies the NLRA. In Barrentine, for example, the Court explicitly
distinguished the NLRA from the FLSA. The Court noted that lower courts
"ordinarily defer to collectively bargained dispute-resolution procedures when the
parties' dispute arises out of the collective-bargaining process." 216 Such deferral, the
Court further noted, advances a national policy favoring collective bargaining. 217 By
contrast, the FLSA directly regulates the relationship between the employer and
employees by granting employees specific substantive rights guaranteeing minimum
standards. 218 The argument that an arbitration award should be given preclusive effect
since wages are at the heart of collective bargaining was rejected with the following
observation: "In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act, which was
designed to minimize industrial strife and to improve working conditions by
encouraging employees to promote their interests collectively, the FLSA was
designed to give specific minimum protections to individual workers ...."219
In reaching its conclusion in Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald, the Court
partially relied on the nonwaivability of rights created by Title VII, the FLSA, and
concurring in part and dissenting in part); United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 561 (1984) (Zimmerman,
Mem., dissenting); Peck, supra note 118.
211. See Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 657 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
212. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
213. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
214. McDonald v. City of vest Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1981).
215. Id. at 290.
216. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 736 (1981).
217. [l]ndividual workers have little, if any, bargaining power, and... "by pooling their economic strength
and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have
the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions," ....
[lihese statutes reflect Congress' determination that to improve the economic well-being of workers, and thus
to promote industrial peace, the interests of some employees in a bargaining unit may have to be subordinated
to the collective interests of a majority of their co-workers. The rights established through this system of
majority rule are thus protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of
minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.'" To further
this policy, Congress has declared that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement."
Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 734, 737.
219. Id. at 739 (emphasis in original).
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section 1983.220 In the Court's view, granting preclusive effect to contractual
settlement procedures would have undermined congressional intent. In contrast,
statutory rights created under the NLRA are waivable within limits, 221 and the Act
specifically provides for the private adjustment of disputes.222 Furthermore, the
Board does not relinquish final authority to decide unfair labor practices through its
deferral policy. 223
In spite of statutory policies that make preclusion inappropriate under Title VII,
the FLSA, and section 1983, Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald permit courts to
weigh the arbitration award in resolving the statutory claims. 224 In these cases, the
Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to consider the scope of contractual
protection, the degree of procedural fairness, the adequacy of the record, and the
competence of the arbitrator-giving great weight to awards that reflect a full
consideration of statutory rights based upon an adequate record.22 5 Thus, even when
the Court felt bound by clearly articulated statutory policy to deny preclusive effect
to arbitration, it still gave this procedure an effect that may be preclusive in many
cases. A lesser role for arbitration can hardly be urged under a statute such as the
NLRA in which the private legislation and enforcement of employment rights are
central to the statutory scheme. 226
While the minority of the Board, which opposes extending pre-arbitral deferral
to cases involving individual rights, draws support from the Alexander and Bar-
rentine cases, 227 Chairman Murphy's concurring opinion in General American
Transportation228 provided the impetus for this view. For Chairman Murphy, the
policy of encouraging collective bargaining is different from the policy of protecting
the workers' rights of freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
union representatives for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment. 229 Encouraging collective bargaining through deferral is appropriate
when the unfair labor practice charge depends on contract interpretation, she argued,
220. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 n.12 (1984).
221. See Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA :Part 1: A Fresh Approach to Board Deferral
to Arbitration, 4 INrus. REL. L.J. 680 (1981).
222. See National Labor Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
223. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
Another objection to arbitration voiced in Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald is the limited authority of arbitrators
as interpreters of the contract. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974). Such a concern is not
applicable to the Board's deferral policy, however, since United Technologies and Olin preclude deferral when the
contract is of insufficient scope to resolve the unfair labor practice issues. See supra notes 110, 144 and accompanying
text. Cf. Levy, supra note 150, at 376.
224. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 n.13 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743-44 n.22 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
225. See supra note 224.
226. Cf. Moses, supra note 150, at 233; Peck, supra note 118, at 382, 388 (arguing that arbitration could be given
considerable weight but the Board should deal with the merits).
227. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 561 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting).
228. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977) (Murphy, Chr., concurring).
229. Id. at 811. In making this distinction, Chairman Murphy relied on the following language from Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956): "The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon
assurance of full freedom of association. Only after that is assured can the parties turn to effective negotiation as a means
of maintaining the normal flow of commerce and . . . the full production of articles and commodities .... "
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but the Board's duty to protect freedom of association makes deferral inappropriate
when the unfair labor practice involves individual rights. 230 In addition to this
perceived statutory dichotomy, Chairman Murphy felt it inappropriate "on princi-
ple" for arbitrators as private adjudicators to decide public rights issues. She argued
that individual employees have too little control over the process and that arbitrators
lack the power to properly decide statutory issues. She was also concerned about the
degree of compromise inherent in normal grievance processing and the impossibility
of processing each grievance to arbitration.
Chairman Murphy's position in General American Transportation, however,
reflects an overly narrow view of the statute, its purpose, and the role of the Board.
As explained earlier, 23' the legislative history and judicial interpretation make it clear
that the statute was designed to permit employees to help themselves through
collective action. Congress intended that individual employees would secure a wide
range of employment rights through the bargaining success of their majority
representative. These rights include not only improvements in economic benefits and
working conditions but the right to fair treatment as individual human beings. 232
From the beginning, the Board's major role has been to protect the free choice of
employees in selecting a collective bargaining representative. This conclusion is
borne out by the substantial portion of the Board's caseload that is devoted to
representation disputes233 as well as by the bulk of the Board's unfair labor practice
work that deals with pre-agreement conduct. 234
After the agreement is in place, collective bargaining supplies and enforces a
panoply of employee rights. 235 In this context, "encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" and "protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association" are merely two sides of the same coin.236 Any shift in
emphasis is primarily related to the stage of the collective bargaining process in which
the issues arise. During the selection phase, the Board's role is exclusive and no
question of deferral arises, since there is no collective bargaining agreement to which
the Board can defer. After agreements are in place, the Board must continue to
address representation questions and protect the collective bargaining process. But as
long as the process is working as intended by Congress, issues of individual rights
should be handled by the parties' private system. 237
230. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 811-12 (1977) (Murphy, Chr., concurring) ("Since genuine
collective bargaining cannot take place until the employees' full freedom of association is assured," the Board must
resolve the dispute when individual freedoms included in § 7 of the Act are at stake.).
231. See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
233. See 47 NLRB A.se. REP. 260 (1982) (showing that of the 46,373 cases received by the Board during fiscal year
1982, 8,276 (17.8%) were representation cases).
234. See supra note 187.
235. The typical collective bargaining agreement accords employees a far broader scale of protection than the
NLRA. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
236. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (explaining that the two policies referred to in § 1 of the Act are complementary).
237. See Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970); Mastro Plastics Corp., 350
U.S. 270, 280 (1956). See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEolsLAlvE
HSTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGoMENr RaAloxs Act 1947, at 429 (1985), in which it was stated:
It is the purpose of this bill to encourage free-collective bargaining; it would not be conducive to that objective
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Two other criticisms of Chairman Murphy's position bear mentioning. In both
General American Transportation and Robinson, decided on the same day, Chairman
Murphy affirmed the Collyer rationale. 238 The Collyer rationale, however, is
inconsistent with the position Chairman Murphy took in General American Trans-
portation.239 The Collyer decision was based on the need to accommodate both the
policy favoring voluntary settlement of labor disputes and the Board's jurisdiction to
prevent and remedy unfair labor practices. When collective bargaining possesses the
stability and suitability to resolve the dispute, when there is no hostility to individual
employee rights, and when the parties are willing to use their settlement procedures,
these policies are best accommodated by deferral. 240 Collyer did not say that only
contract interpretation cases are suitable for resolution through grievance arbitration;
it only held that such cases are suitable for such resolution. It does not follow that
cases involving adverse employer actions, such as those allegedly lacking "just
cause," would not be equally suited for arbitration under the Collyer rationale.
Secondly, Chairman Murphy maintained that deferral is inappropriate in
individual rights cases while simultaneously professing a belief "that deferral to an
arbitrator's award is appropriate under the Spielberg guidelines where all of the
parties, including the affected employee, have voluntarily submitted their dispute to
the arbitrators.' 241 Yet a decision by the Board to defer under Spielberg means the
Board has concluded that the grievance-arbitration procedure fairly resolved the
unfair labor practice issue; the private system properly considered the individual
employee's statutory rights; the arbitrator had sufficient authority to consider the
unfair labor practice issue; and the private system successfully protected public
rights. 242 Without substantial evidence to the contrary, the Collyer majority simply
refused to hold a priori that the parties' grievance-arbitration procedure would not
resolve the dispute consistently with Spielberg. Thus, supporting Spielberg deferral
runs counter to rejecting Collyer deferral in individual rights cases. 243
Because Chairman Murphy supports Spielberg, her argument essentially is an
objection to forcing individual employees to submit to a process to which they
if the Board became the forum for trying day-to-day grievances or if in the guise of unfair labor practice cases
it entertained damage actions arising out of breach of contract. Hence the committee anticipates that the Board
will develop by rules and regulations a policy of entertaining under these provisions only such cases alleging
violation of contract as cannot be settled by resort to the machinery established by the contract itself, voluntary
arbitration, or if necessary by litigation in court.
Issues of individual rights arising under the Landrum-Griffin Act, however, are handled by the Court. See supra note
170 and accompanying text.
238. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977) (Murphy, Chr., concurring); Robinson,
228 N.LR.B. 828 (1977).
239. For a repudiation of Chairman Murphy's view of Collyer, see Alleyne, Arbitrators and the NLRB: The Nature
of the Deferral Beast, 4 INnus. RsL. L.J. 587, 594-600 (1981).
240. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1979).
241. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 803, 813 (1977) (Murphy, Chr., concurring).
242. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
243. For examples of similar inconsistencies, see Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 846 (1971) (Fanning,
Mem., dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 532-36 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, Mers., dissenting)
(calling the Board's Collyer decision a reversal of Spielberg, since no award was required and the "'fact or regularity"




supposedly have never agreed.244 Yet the reality is that individual employees elect the
majority representative and vote on the ratification of contractual provisions,
including grievance-arbitration procedures. Under the system of majority rule, the
individual has a voice in selecting the representative and the programs that will bind
all members of the unit. Requiring individual employees to use procedures that have
been selected in individual rights cases is not different from requiring the union to use
such procedures in contract interpretation cases.
Moreover, requiring unwilling individuals to use contractual procedures is
consistent with national labor policy. Under our system of collective bargaining,
individual employees experience both the benefits and burdens of the collective
process. Congress has chosen to protect individuals from the imperfections of the
collective bargaining system in a variety of ways, including Board determined units,
the bill of rights for union members, the right not to join a union, the right to present
grievances, a duty to bargain only with respect to "mandatory" subjects, and the
duty of fair representation. 245
2. Grievance-Arbitration Is Not Designed or Competent to Protect Statutory
Rights
A second objection to deferral is simply that arbitration does not adequately
protect individuals. Some courts and commentators lament the trade offs that
characterize collective bargaining negotiations, adding that unions may fail to
vigorously protect individual rights without violating the duty of fair representa-
tion. 246 Compromise is certainly a dominant feature of contract negotiations, and
unions are given great latitude in striking reasonable accommodations of the many
interests they represent. 247 To a lesser degree, compromises also occur during
grievance processing, but these agreements are more strictly scrutinized by the courts
in light of the union's duty of fair representation. 248 Congress, however, intended
collective bargaining, with all of its strengths and weaknesses, to create and preserve
the employment rights of individuals. To the extent the critics' argument that unions
can fail to protect individual rights without violating the duty of fair representation is
persuasive, it undercuts the entire collective bargaining system. 249
A similar but less expansive attack is that arbitration is not well-suited to resolve
unfair labor practice issues because of the limited competency and authority of
arbitrators as well as the procedural deficiencies of the arbitration process itself.25 0
244. But see National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 533 (1977) (Fanning & Jenkins, Mems., dissenting) (arguing
that § 9(a) of the Act gives employees a right to submit grievances outside the grievance procedure).
245. See Emporium Capwell v. Westem Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). See generally A. Cox,
D. BoK, & R. Gop.ANs, supra note 163, at 381-82.
246. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 563 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting); Taylor v.
NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1986).
247. See Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1985); Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 251 (1977).
248. See Summers, supra note 247.
249. See Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Summers, supra note 247.
250. See, e.g., Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 657 (1 lth Cir. 1986); United Technologies
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This criticism, however, is unfounded. First, arbitrators are a highly educated group
of professionals representing a variety of fields including "professors, lawyers,
judges, public office holders, ministers, accountants, economists, and professional
arbitrators. ' 2 5 1 Surveys indicate that a majority have law degrees and a substantial
minority have graduate degrees. 252 Second, arbitrators who are most acceptable to
unions and employers have many years of experience in the field. 253 Finally, the
majority of cases decided by arbitrators are discipline and discharge cases, in which
the grievances may involve statutory issues. 254 Thus, arbitrators have the acumen and
experience to decide individual rights issues referred to them under the Board's
current deferral policy. Moreover, recent writings suggest that the community of
arbitrators is aware of the special statutory implications of arbitral decisions. 255
Furthermore, deferral under Olin and United Technologies is designed to occur
only when the arbitrator has authority to resolve the unfair labor practice aspects of
the dispute.2 56 In addition, pre-arbitral cases are not deferred unless contractual
provisions are broad enough to encompass the unfair labor practice dispute. 5 7
Arbitration awards in post-settlement cases only pass muster if the contractual and
statutory issues are factually parallel and evidence relevant to the unfair labor practice
has been presented. 258 Since the Board will decide whether the statutory and
contractual issues are properly coextensive, the arbitrator need concentrate only on
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 563 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mems., dissenting); Levy, supra note 150, at 383-85; Vause, supra
note 150.
251. See F. Etxou & E. ELKOuRI, supra note 60, at 138.
252. See Tabulations & Computations Made from the Committee's Questionnaire, 1976, 29 PRoc. oF NAT'L AC&D.
ARB. 376, 376-82 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tabulations & Computations]; Herrick, Profile of a Labor Arbitrator, 37
ARB. J. 18 (1982); Sprehe & Small, Members and Nonmembers of the National Academy ofArbitrators: Do They Differ?,
39 ARB. J. 25 (1984); Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of Arbitration Awards, 1985
DEr. C.L. REv. 31 (1985).
253. See Tabulations & Computations supra note 252, at 377; Zirkel, supra note 252, at 38. See also Stephenson
v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing the education and experience of arbitrators and conceding
that arbitrators have superior competence in contract interpretation matters and equal competence in making factual
determinations).
254. See FEDERAL MEotAnoN & CONaixnoN SEsvxcE Auro.iAT.D InFORMAtiON SysrTFts AssrtnRAo STATS'nCS FtscAl. YEAR
1985; Zirkel, supra note 252, at 40.
255. See, e.g., Mack & Bernstein, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Demanding Role,
40 ARE. J. 33 (1985); McKelvey, The Duty of Fair Representation: Has the Arbitrator a Responsibility?, 41 As. J. 51
(1986); Rabin, Fair Representation in Arbitration, in TR CHANGING LAw oF FAIR RRR 5R ,rATiON 178-80 (J. McKelvey ed.
1985).
256. See supra notes 108-11, 142-45 and accompanying text. On the debate over whether arbitrators should decide
questions of external law, see Brown, The National Labor Policy, the NLRB, and Arbitration, 21 PRoc. oF NAT'L ACAD.
ARE. 83 (1968); Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, 6 PRoc. or NAT'L AcAo. ARB. 76 (1953); Edwards, Labor
Arbitration at the Crossroads: The Common Law of the Shop v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977); Feller, The Impact
of External Law upon Labor Arbitration, in THE FtruRE OF LABOR AmrtxAltox IN AhiaucA 83 (B. Aaron ed. 1976); Feller,
The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 PRoc. OF NAT'L ACAD. Ass. 97, 125-26 (1976); Jones, The Role of
Arbitration in State and National Labor Policy, 24 PROC. OF NAT'L AcAD. AR. 42 (1971); Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators:
Observations on the Scope ofJudical Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1980); Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law,
and Labor Arbitration, 20 PRoc. OF NAT'L Ac,. ARB. 1 (1967); Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, 21 PROc. OF
NAT'L AcAo. ARB. 42 (1968); St. Antoine, supra note 69; Sovem, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, 73
PRoc. OF NAT'L AcAD. Ass. 29 (1970).
257. Many contracts specifically forbid statutory violations, thereby giving arbitrators the authority to decide
external law issues. See Mittenthal, supra note 256, at 43. For deferral standards relating to the necessary scope of the
contract, see United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
258. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
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resolving the contractual issues fairly. This is precisely the extent of the arbitrator's
authority and responsibility under the contract.
Critics cite as additional arbitral shortcomings the lack of judicial formalities,
such as rules of evidence and stenographic records, discovery, subpoena powers,
clear burdens of proof, regard for precedent, and counsel.2 9 Yet informality has been
frequently cited as the strength of arbitration and modem arbitration is often criticized
in other forums as becoming too formal. 260 Today, the typical arbitration proceeding
approaches the formality of a Board proceeding. 261 For instance, neither the Board
nor arbitration has the pre-hearing discovery that is customary in civil courts. 262
Subpoenas are issued by the Board and arbitrators, but court enforcement is necessary
in both instances. 263 Arbitral burdens of proof are well-defined and are dependent
upon the type of case. 264 While arbitrators are not required to follow precedent and
are expected to apply the parties' terms and not those of another contract, they
generally seek guidance from and indeed often follow other awards. 265 Although not
required, counsel frequently appear on behalf of parties in arbitration as well as in
Board proceedings. 266 The Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association show that due process is contemplated for all arbitration
participants. 267 Empirical data suggest that charging parties, especially individuals,
often fare better in grievance arbitration than they would have before the Board. 268
259. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 60, at 130 (arguing that relaxation of formalities turns to total collapse when
the arbitration lacks a neutral party).
260. See, e.g., Raffaele, Lawyers in Labor Arbitration, 37 AP. J. 14 (1982).
261. See Nolan & Abrams, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 37 LAB. L.J. 437 (1986); Alleyne, supra note 239, at
596 (arguing that Board and arbitration proceedings are quite similar). Rules adopted by the American Arbitration
Association provide for notice, representation by counsel, stenographic record, attendance at hearing by interested parties,
the administering of an oath, the taking of evidence, full opportunity for the presentation of proof, and other procedural
guarantees. A. iEuecAN AurrRo.n Assoc Alno: VoLuNTARY LABoR A r.BamAToN RuLis; 19-22, 24, 28-29 (1965).
Moreover, Board hearings also lack formality. The ALl is not robed, the cases need not be presented by an attorney,
and the rules of evidence are not strictly followed.
262. See Comment, NLRB Discovery After Robbins: More Peril for Private Litigants, 47 FORDnAsl L. REv. 393
(1978); Comment, NLRB Discovery Practice: The Applicability of the Discovery Provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 845.
263. See National Labor Relations Act §11(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. §161(l), (2) (1982); F. Etzoux & E. Etmousp, supra
note 60, at 305-08.
264. See F. Etoui & E. Etousi, supra note 60, at 324, 614-17, 661. See also Levy, supra note 150, at 379 (the
requirement that employers must prove "just cause" in discipline and discharge cases gives employees more protection).
265. See Rehmus, Writing the Opinion, in ARrrA-ioN IN P.AcncE 209, 219-21 (A. Zack ed. 1984).
266. See A. Cox, D. Bog, & R. Gos.m, supra note 163, at 106.
267. See AmmucAN AesrrRA oN AssocsAnos: VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBorAsiox RutEs, U 20 (representation by counsel),
21 (stenographic record), 22 (attendance at hearings), 23 (adjournments), 26 (order of proceedings), 28 (evidence)(1965).
See also id. at T 26 ("The Arbitrator may, in his discretion, vary the normal procedure under which the initiating party
first presents its claim, but in any case shall afford full and equal opportunity to all parties for presentation of relevant
proofs.").
Many of these due process procedures are required even when arbitration lacks a neutral party. See Miller, Teamster
Joint Committees: The Legal Equivalent of Arbitration, 37 Psoc. OF NAT'L AcA. Ass. 118, 119 (1984).
268. See Wolkinson, The Impact of the Collyer Policy of Deferral: An Empirical Study, 38 Ir,'Dus. & LAB. REL. REV.
377 (1985); Alleyne, supra note 239, at 593-96 (1981).
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3. Deferral Improperly Shifts Board Jurisdiction to Arbitration Without Adequate
Oversight
Opponents have argued that "deferral amounts to an abdication by [the Board]
of its obligation under Section 10(a) of the Act to protect employees' rights and the
public interest by preventing and remedying unfair labor practices.' '269 Many of these
critics endorse pre-settlement deferral under Collyer when the unfair labor practice
hinges on contract interpretation, and post-settlement deferral when the award meets
Spielberg standards. 270 In pre-settlement contract interpretation cases, the Board
seeks guidance from an arbitrator's interpretation of contractual provisions that are
relevant to the alleged unfair labor practice. In post-settlement cases, the Board may
approve arbitration under a repugnancy standard without necessarily agreeing with
the result. 27 1
Under Olin, the Board reviews the same category of cases it did before that
decision. And United Technologies properly gives the grievance procedure the first
chance to resolve all suitable disputes. 272 Thus, the degree of oversight retained by
the Board under Spielberg and Olin, particularly if the proposals made here are
included, encourages collective bargaining while insuring proper supervision. 273
4. United Technologies and Olin Do Not Go Far Enough
Judge Harry T. Edwards argues that the Board's Olin and United Technologies
decisions are properly directed toward limited review of arbitration awards but are
"grounded on a faulty rationale.'"274 He believes that with few exceptions "when the
parties negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and stipulate that they will
arbitrate disputes arising under it, they have waived many of their statutory rights
under the NLRA ... [and that] [t]he parties' agreement, in essence, supplants the
statute as the source of many employee rights .... ,"275 For Judge Edwards, arbitral
awards should not be reviewed even for factual parallelism or for evidence relating
to the unfair labor practice issue. 276 Rather, the award should stand unless either its
essence is not drawn from the contract or the contract itself is illegal, a narrower
standard than the OlinlSpielberg "repugnancy" test.277 Judge Edwards acknowl-
edges that certain issues are nonwaivable and thus exempts cases involving the duty
269. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 579 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting). See also Levy, supra note 150,
at 374.
270. See, e.g., United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 564 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting);
Morris, supra note 150, at 299.
271. See Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 138 n.8 (1982).
272. "Suitability" is determined by the nature of the issues and the scope of the contract. As cases after Olin and
Uniled Technologies indicate, the Board does not deem representation, information, and § 8(a)(4) issues to be "suitable."
Cases also indicate that the Board takes seriously the "scope" issue in both the pre- and pest-arbitral contexts. See infra
notes 307-61 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 377-429 and accompanying text.
274. Edwards, supra note 150, at 28.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 29-30.
277. Id. at 31, 39.
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of fair representation and individual rights that do not depend on contract interpre-
tation.278
Yet the "waiver" theory is not useful in analyzing most of the cases that are
controversial under the Board's new deferral pronouncements. Contracts generally do
not waive an individual's right to be free from unlawful discrimination and
coercion. 279 Rather, contracts expand such freedom to include any adverse treatment
without "just cause.' 280 Thus, statutory rights are augmented rather than displaced
by the typical collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the Board retains
responsibility for assuring that statutory rights are not lost in this expansion.
281
Judge Edwards' proposal envisions identical reviewing functions by the Board
and courts when arbitral awards resolve contractual disputes. 282 Eliminating cases
involving individual noncontractual rights and the duty of fair representation, Judge
Edwards argues that since the collective bargaining agreement supplants many
statutory rights and since the arbitrator's decision is part of the contract, the Board's
inquiry should be limited to whether the contract as interpreted is illegal. 283 This
position, however, overlooks the different purposes of judicial and Board review.
Courts reviewing arbitration awards under section 301 of the Act are primarily
concerned with protecting the intent of the parties and preserving the integrity of the
legal system. The Board, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with protecting
the collective bargaining process. While courts inquire as to whether the parties'
intent is undermined, the Board questions the effect of conduct on collective
bargaining. 284
278. Id. at 28, 31, 34. The two cases principally relied upon by Judge Edwards, Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331
(D.C. Cir. 1982), and American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983), are individual rights cases
that turn on contract interpretation.
On the waiver issue, see generally Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part !, 4 INus. RE..
L. J. 335 (1981); and Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II: A Fresh Approach to Board
Deferral to Arbitration, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 680 (1981).
279. Typically, collective bargaining agreements contain due process protections against discharge or discipline
without "just cause." This protection is, therefore, not limited to employer actions motivated by antiunion sentiments.
See CBNC, supra note 56, at 40:1-303.
280. A recent study indicates that 86% of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed contained "just cause"
provisions protecting employees against unreasonable employer conduct. See CBNC, supra note 56, at 40:1. Other
frequently occurring provisions protecting individual rights in the workplace were disciplinary systems, grievance
procedures, lay-off provisions, seniority provisions, and provisions relating to promotion, demotion, and transfer. Id. at
40:1, 51:1, 60:1, 75:1, 68:1.
281. Cf. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLR.A: Part 11: A Fresh Approach to Board Deferral
to Arbitration, 4 I,-Nts. REL.L.J. 680 (1981) (arguing that the Board's decision not to exercise jurisdiction rests on the
premise that the Board's protection is at least partially waived by the union through the establishment and use of a
grievance procedure). Professor Harper's view overlooks the fact that waiver and deferral present fundamentally different
questions. The waiver issue concerns the extent to which the majority representative can sacrifice individual statutory
rights in order to secure collective benefits. The deferral issue involves the extent to which collective bargaining can be
relied upon to resolve the entire dispute, including unfair labor practice allegations.
Statutory rights exist for the purpose of securing collective bargaining. Once those protections have been secured,
these rights continue to have vitality only to assure that the collective bargaining process functions as Congress intended.
After a collective bargaining agreement has been reached, the Board's exercise of jurisdiction is triggered only by
fundamental questions of representation, the threatened integrity of either the collective bargaining process or the Board's
enforcement machinery, or collective bargaining's inability to handle the dispute.
282. See Edwards, supra note 150, at 27-32.
283. Id. at 31, 36.
284. Pursuant to its statutory role, the Board must be alert for procedural maladies such as the refusal to supply
information, representational unfairness and procedural irregularity, instability in the collective bargaining relationship,
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For example, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,2 85 the company and union
agreed upon a no-strike clause and a conventional grievance procedure.2 86 Union
members participated in an unlawful work stoppage, and the company disciplined the
local union officials more harshly than other strike participants. The arbitrator denied
a union official's grievance, finding that the official had "an affirmative duty to
protect the authority of the Union leadership from illegitimate action on the part of
employees, and to uphold the sanctity of the Agreement and its established grievance
procedures." 287
Since this award does not violate the law or public policy and is a plausible
reading of the contract, it should be enforced by the courts.2 88 On the other hand,
discrimination against union officials based solely on their union status would
undermine a union's ability to bargain with the employer. 28 9 Thus, an arbitral award
permitting such discrimination in the absence of a "waiver" would threaten the
bargaining process and would properly be deemed "repugnant. "290 In its supervisory
role, the Board should refuse deferral and hear such a case de novo. 29 1 The
coexistence of the Board's duty to protect collective bargaining and the statutory
policy favoring collective bargaining require an oversight of the grievance procedure
by the Board that is not shared by courts in contract enforcement actions.
5. Negation of the Mid-Term Duty to Bargain-or De Facto Waiver
The duty to bargain under the NLRA is a dual obligation to meet and confer in
good faith and to refrain from making unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment without first bargaining to impasse. 292 This twin duty continues during
and inadequate contractual scope. Settlements may be repugnant as a result of their potential impact on collective
bargaining. In individual rights cases, the concern for the integrity of collective bargaining can be met by insuring that
arbitration is capable of addressing the issue.
285. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
286. The clause read as follows:
The Brotherhood and its members agree that during the term of this agreement there shall be no strikes or
walkouts by the Brotherhood or its members, and the Company agrees that there shall be no lockouts of the
Brotherhood or its members, it being the desire of both parties to provide uninterrupted and continuous service
to the public.
Id. at 695.
287. Id. at 696 n.2 (emphasis in original).
288. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
289. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 702-04 (1983) (upholding the Board's view that the
discriminatory suspension of the local union president was "inherently destructive" of employee rights).
290. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984).
291. Judge Edwards would not defer when the contract is illegal, because "no public policy is served by allowing
arbitrators to enforce illegal contracts." Edwards, supra note 150, at 31. Similarly, no public policy is served when
awards generally violate the policies and purposes of the Act. It is therefore appropriate for the Board to review arbitration
awards for repugnancy.
292. See National Labor Relations Ac: § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982). For text of these
provisions, see supra note 30. Section 8(d) of the Act also provides as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder ....
[Ihe duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification
of the terms and conditions contained in a contract . ...
National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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the term of a collective bargaining agreement, primarily through the processing of
disputes under the parties' grievance and arbitration procedures.
A majority of the Board in Jacobs Manufacturing Co. 29 3 interpreted subsection
8(d) of the Act as requiring the parties to bargain about mandatory subjects that were
not part of the agreement reached by the parties upon executing the contract. The
Board considered matters which were fully discussed or consciously explored during
negotiations to be a part of the bargain, even though not explicitly addressed in the
agreement. 294 Thus, Jacobs would prevent an employer from making mid-term
unilateral changes in undiscussed mandatory bargaining subjects without first
bargaining to impasse with the union. On the other hand, if the contract authorizes an
employer to take unilateral action or if the union specifically waives its right to
bargain on a subject, the employer may unilaterally change the terms and conditions
of employment. 295
One Board member argued in dissent that the majority rule in Jacobs undermines
the collective bargaining process, since written agreements reflect both expressed and
unexpressed concessions and trade offs. 296 The Board member urged that it is
inconsistent with this process and the stability produced by collective bargaining to
permit either party to continually demand alteration of settled rights and obligations
under the contract. The better rule, in his view, would treat the collective bargaining
agreement as obligating the parties to continue the status quo during the term of the
contract and as permitting only those unilateral changes that are authorized by the
contract. 29
7
It has been suggested that deferral has been used as a substitute for the "waiver"
in subsection 8(a)(5) cases involving unilateral changes during the term of the
agreement. 298 For example, changing the pre-settlement factual paradigm discussed
above,299 assume that the agreement contained no provision relating to subcontract-
ing. The employer decided that it could reduce labor costs, lower the price of the
product, and avoid losing its market share by subcontracting a portion of the work
performed by the union employees. Without first discussing the matter with the
293. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
294. Id.
295. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 270 N.L.R.B.
686 (1984).
296. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1231-32 (1951) (Reynolds, Mem., concurring separately and dissenting
in part).
297. Id. The theme articulated by the dissent in Jacobs was first articulated by Professors Cox and Dunlop.
In our view the contracts incorporated an implied undertaking that the status quo would be continued for the
duration of the contract except as the contract or some supplemental agreement might provide for a change. For
either party to make a change, therefore, would violate this understanding as well as the prohibition against
unauthorized unilateral action contained in sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).
Cox & Dunlop, The Dute to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1097,
1127 (1950). This theme has also been adopted in more recent scholarly commentary. See Peck, supra note 118, at 365:
The Jacobs rule that there is a continuing duty to bargain during the term of an agreement provides a basis for
continued involvement of the NLRB with the contractual relationship between the parties even though they have
negotiated in good faith and reached an agreement which has its own dispute resolution procedures. This
involvement fits uncomfortably with the well-established proposition that Congress did not intend the NLRB to
serve as a forum in which suits might be brought for breach of contract.
298. See Peck, supra note 118, at 367.
299. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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union, the employer subcontracts the work and, in response, the union files a
grievance under the contract and a charge under subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act. If
subcontracting has not been discussed during pre-contract negotiations and is deemed
a mandatory subject of bargaining by the Board, 3° ° the Board would hold this
unilateral mid-contract change a violation of the statutory duty to bargain.
Under the grievance procedure, the issue would be whether the employer had the
authority to subcontract the work without consulting the union, essentially the same
issue to be decided by the Board.301 Thus, the contract is sufficiently broad to resolve
the statutory issue.30 2 Since the charge is filed before the grievance procedure has
produced a settlement, the Board should defer to the grievance procedures. If an
arbitrator ultimately decides that the employer had authority under the contract to
subcontract the work, the Board would decide under Spielberg and Olin whether to
defer to the award. 30 3 If the Board deferred to the award, such a decision could be
viewed as overruling Jacobs or finding a de facto waiver of the duty to bargain when
the parties had expressed no such duty. A requirement of legal as well as factual
parallelism as preconditions for deferral might be deemed necessary to resolve this
perceived problem.
Under a general theory of deferral, however, the arbitrator's decision would be
vulnerable to two attacks on Spielberg and Olin review. First, if the parties presented
no evidence of the contractual language and negotiating history to show that the
employer had express authority to subcontract work or that the matter was fully
discussed, the arbitration would fail to meet the Olin test of adequate consider-
ation. 3° 4 The arbitrator would not have been presented with facts generally relevant
to the unfair labor practice charge. Accordingly, the General Counsel should be able
to show the procedure's failure to demonstrate a fair collective bargaining solution.
Second, the arbitrator's award may be deemed repugnant to the Act. If the
subcontracting involved a substantial amount of unit work, the General Counsel
might easily establish that the employer's conduct as condoned by the arbitral award
threatened collective bargaining. 30 5
This analysis demonstrates that the Board does not negate the duty to bargain
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement by its deferral policy in
300. See Otis Elevator, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
301. See C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
302. If the contract specifically removed the issue of subcontracting from the grievance procedure, the Board's
pre-deferral analysis would result in a decision not to defer since the express terms of the contract would reveal the
grievance procedure as incapable of resolving the statutory issue.
303. In the absence of any provision on subcontracting, the arbitrator's decision on the employer's contractual
authority may depend upon the arbitrator's view of management rights. If the arbitrator believes that management retains
all prerogatives not specifically limited by the agreement, she will deny the grievance. On the other hand, if she believes
that management shares power over the terms and conditions of employment with its employees as represented by the
union, she may find that the employer is without authority to subcontract unit work without bargaining with the union.
Compare Phelps, Management's Reserved Rights: An Industry View, 9 Poc. or NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 102, 105-07 (1956)
with Killingsworth, The Presidential Address: Management Rights Revisited, 22 PRoc. OF NAT'L Ac,o. ARB. 1, 3-13,
18-19 (1969).
304. See supra notes 108-I1 and accompanying text.




subsection 8(a)(5) cases. Nor are legal and factual parallelisms necessary for a
deferral policy to be consistent with the Board's statutory mandate. Deferral simply
seeks to give the parties' procedure the first opportunity to resolve the dispute. It
neither absolves the Board of responsibility for deciding unfair labor practice cases
nor precludes the Board from so doing. Because there are other reasons to refrain
from holding the parties' contractual procedure accountable for the interpretation of
external law, a standard of legal parallelism is inappropriate. 30 6 If the Board is
faithful to the theory articulated in this Article, it will easily identify those cases that
pose unacceptable risks to national labor policy.
I. THE IMPACT OF UNITED TECHNOLOGIES AND OLIN
Theoretically, United Technologies' extension of pre-settlement deferral to
individual rights cases and Olin's new "adequate consideration" and burden of proof
rules further the certainty of deferral policy. They also seemingly advance the cause
of collective bargaining, and permit the Board to responsibly carry out its statutory
mandate. While these developments are consistent with the general theory of deferral
articulated in this Article, the question remains: Have the decided cases since United
Technologies and Olin lived up to this theoretical billing?
A. United Technologies' Progeny
Since the United Technologies decision the Board has decided fifty-three cases
presenting fifty-seven pre-settlement deferral issues. 30 7 The Board deferred to the
parties' grievance procedures on twenty-one of the fifty-seven issues. 308 These
deferred cases involved typical allegations of individual threats and discrimination,
unilateral changes, and refusals to bargain. None touched on the Board's non-
deferrable responsibility. In each case, broad contractual provisions and a healthy
relationship between the parties enabled collective bargaining to resolve the dispute
fairly. 30 9 In addition, the decision to defer was made only when the alleged conduct
of the parties did not threaten the collective bargaining process. 31 0
The Board decided not to defer on thirty-six of the fifty-seven issues. The largest
number of decisions against deferral involved an employer's failure to disclose
information necessary either for grievance processing or for performing the repre-
sentational function, 3t t followed by cases dealing with inadequate contractual
306. See Feller, supra note 256; St. Antoine, supra note 69.
307. Appendix I summarizes these decisions and explains the cases in which the Board declined to defer.
308. See Appendix I and decisions cited therein.
309. See, e.g., Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1342 (1986).
310. Cf. Rappazzo Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299 (Sept. 16, 1986).
311. See E.W. Buschman Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1253 (Oct. 31, 1985); United States
Postal Serv., 276 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1985); Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1985); 0. Voorhees Painting Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 779 (1985); General Dynamics Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 829 (1984); General Dynamics Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
1432 (1984).
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scope, 312 retaliation for using Board processes, 31 3 concerns for administrative
economy, 314 and rejection of collective bargaining. 31 5 In several cases deferral was
not requested by either party3 1 6 or an unlawful contractual provision was involved. 31 7
The Board also declined to defer cases involving a representation question,3 t 8 a
conflict of interest between an aggrieved employee and both union and manage-
ment,319 and a Board settlement that did not refer the parties to their grievance
procedure. 320 These decisions are consistent with the Board's exclusive role of
defining the structure of collective bargaining, insuring employee freedom of choice,
and defending its own jurisdiction. They also reveal a supervisory role, in which the
Board intervenes only to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and
to hear the dispute when the parties' process is incapable of resolving it.
By not deferring in cases involving an alleged failure to supply relevant
information, the Board has attempted to guarantee that successful private settlement
will not be hampered by unequal access to information. The most dramatic example
of the Board's recognition of the link between successful private settlement and
access to information is Clinchfield Coal Co.3 21 In that case, the ALJ refused to defer
the information issue to arbitration and held that the union had waived the right to
request such information in clear contractual language. 322 The Board affirmed the
AL's deferral decision, but reversed the waiver holding. The Board found that the
contractual language relied upon by the ALJ did not constitute a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver.323 In a holding that reflected a more liberal approach to
312. See Shopmen's Local 539, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1043 (Jan. 22, 1986); Amoco Oil
Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308 (Jan. 16, 1986); Local 702, IBEW, 274 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1935);
IBEW Local 1316, 271 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984).
313. See Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 275 N.L.R.B. 278 (1985); Roadway Express Inc., 274 N.L.R.B.
357 (1985); International Harvester Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 647 (1984).
314. See Coalite Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1030 (Jan. 30, 1986); International Harvester
Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 647 (1984); S.Q.I. Roofing, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984).
315. See Santulli Mail Servs., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1158 (Oct. 17, 1986); Rappazzo
Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 75,124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299 (Sept. 16, 1986); Hutchinson Fruit Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No.
54, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1258 (Nov. 15, 1985); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1985); Victor Block,
Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 676 (1985).
316. See Griffith-Hope Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 487 (1985); United States Postal Serv., 276 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1985);
Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 390 (1984).
317. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 208, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1276 (Feb. 21, 1986);
UAW Local 1161, 271 N.L.R.B. 1411 (1984).
318. See Martin Marietta Chems., 270 N.L.R.B. 821 (1984).
319. See Hendrickson Bros., 272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1984).
320. See General Dynamics Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1984), in which the Board stated:
Thus, the procedural issue of disclosure of the study is merely preliminary to the resolution of the parties'
substantive dispute over the subcontracting. In these circumstances, we find no merit in encumbering the
process of resolving the pending subcontracting grievances with the inevitable delays attendant to the filing,
processing, and submission to arbitration of a new grievance regarding the information request. Such a
two-tiered arbitration process would not be consistent with our national policy favoring the voluntary and
expeditious resolution of disputes through arbitration. Nor would it be consistent with prior Board decision in
this area.
Id. at 1432 n.2.
321. 275 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1985).
322. Id. at 1384.
323. Id..
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the waiver issue than it has shown in other recent cases, 324 the Board noted the
importance of information in resolving substantive issues under the contract. 325
Yet the Board has not imposed upon parties a burden that could not be sustained.
It has exercised jurisdiction when the contract was not of sufficient scope to handle
the statutory issues, 326 when the parties had not requested deferral, 327 and when their
conduct manifested a rejection of the collective bargaining process. 328 In addition, the
Board has not deferred when the alignment of interests created a substantial risk that
the grievance procedure would be incapable of fairly resolving a dispute involving an
individual. 329 The Board's primary and supervisory roles are simultaneously invoked
when the contractual provision at issue is illegal, making arbitration useless and the
Board's ruling on the issue unavoidable. 330
Whether its role is exclusive or supervisory, the Board cannot fulfill its duties of
creating the appropriate structures for collective bargaining or of protecting and
reinforcing the collective process if it does not defend itself against the undermining
of its processes by employers or unions. In such cases the Board must take
jurisdiction to protect its statutory concerns, a fact the Board reaffirmed shortly after
United Technologies.331 Similarly, the Board has exclusive responsibility to deter-
mine the best use of its resources. Thus, it has properly declined to defer when
concerns for administrative economy warrant exercising jurisdiction. 332
In sum, pre-arbitral decisions since United Technologies indicate that the Board
has been sensitive to its dual function. It has exercised jurisdiction when necessary
to implement the statutory design. It also exercised critical oversight of the collective
bargaining process, stepping in when help was needed, but otherwise permitting the
process to function as Congress intended.
B. Olin's Progeny
The Board's post-settlement deferral rate under Spielberg has shown a dramatic
upswing since Olin, from thirty-four percent of the deferral cases considered by the
Board during the three decades after Spielberg to sixty-seven percent of the cases
324. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light, 273 N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985) (holding that a general no-strike clause
waived the right of employees to honor stranger picket lines).
325. Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1385 n.4 (1985).
326. See Shopmen's Local 539, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1043 (Jan. 22, 1986); Amoco Oil
Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308 (Jan. 16, 1986); Local 702, IBEW, 274 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1985);
IBE\V Local 1316, 271 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984).
327. See cases cited supra note 316.
328. See Hutchinson Fruit Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1258 (Nov. 15, 1985); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1985); Victor Block, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 676 (1985).
329. See Hendrickson Bros., 272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1984).
330. See cases cited supra note 317.
331. See International Harvester Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 647, 647 (1984) (quoting Filmation Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B.
1721, 1721 (1977)) ("the duty to preserve the Board's processes from abuse is a function of [the] Board and may not be
delegated to the parties or an arbitrator"). See also Roadway Express Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 357 (1985); Northern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 275 N.L.R.B. 278 (1985). Cf. Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 122
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212 (Apr. 29, 1986); Moses, supra note 150, at 234.
332. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 647 (1984) (in which the Board considered a connected
§ 8(a)(3) claim when it refused to defer a § 8(a)(4) claim). Accord Coalite Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 122 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1030 (Jan. 30, 1986); S.Q.l. Roofing Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984).
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considered after Olin.333 Forty-eight post-settlement deferral issues have been
presented in the forty-seven cases decided since Olin.334 The Board deferred to the
grievance settlement or arbitration award in thirty instances. Of the eighteen issues
not deferred, the largest number were reversed as repugnant to the Act. 335 The Board
also declined deferral in cases involving representation questions, 336 procedural
bars, 337 insufficient contractual scope, 338 no deferral request, 339 a nongrievance
settlement,340 insufficient evidence, 341 nonparallel contractual and statutory is-
sues, 342 and alleged employer retaliation. 343
As in pre-settlement deferral cases, the Board also has been vigilant in guarding
against threats to the collective bargaining process posed by arbitral awards. In
Garland Coal & Mining Co.,344 the Board used a finding of "repugnancy" to strike
down an award that would have prevented union officials from representing the
legitimate interests of their constituency in collective bargaining. In that case, the
employer suspended and discharged a union local president for refusing to sign an
employer memorandum that denied the union's authority to represent a segment of the
workforce. The arbitrator had upheld the employer's claim that the refusal constituted
insubordination. Exhibiting an awareness of the central focus of its jurisdiction, the
Board said: "While recognizing the importance of arbitration, the Board will, where
necessary, vindicate the Federal interest by declining to defer to an arbitrator's award
when it cannot be arguably reconciled with the policies of the Act. ' 345
Like the pre-settlement cases, the post-settlement cases demonstrate the Board's
concern about whether the parties to a collective bargaining agreement should be
deciding the issue in question. Rejecting arbitral awards in Port Chester Nursing
Home346 and Paper Manufacturers Co.,347 the Board reaffirmed its exclusive control
over unit and representation questions.
333. Between August 17, 1956, and January 21, 1986, 240 Board decisions cited Spielberg. The Board deferred in
81 (33.75%) of those cases. Significantly, 50 of the 81 cases deferred (70.3%) involved § 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l)(A),
or 8(b)(1)(B) claims. See also Appendix H, summarizing the types of post-arbitration cases decided since Olin.
334. See cases summarized in Appendix II.
335. See Earl C. Smith, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1255 (Feb. 21, 1986); Garland Coal
& Mining Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 963 (1985); 1115, Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees Union, 275 N.L.R.B. 272 (1985);
Paper Mfrs. Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 491 (1985); John Morrell & Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984).
336. See Paper Mfrs. Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 491 (1985) (in which the Board should have refused deferral because the
cases involved a representation question, but found that the award was repugnant to the Act because of the arbitrator's
handling of the unit question); Port Chester Nursing Home, 269 N.L.R.B. 150 (1984).
337. See Drummond Coal Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1140 (Jan. 13, 1986).
338. See Cotter & Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 714 (1985).
339. See Manville Forest Prod. Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 390 (1984).
340. See A.N. Electric Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 887 (1985).
341. See Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (Feb. 25, 1986);
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1101 (Dec. 31, 1985); Superior Fast
Freight, 275 N.L.R.B. 329 (1985).
342. See Aces Mechanical Corp., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1145 (Feb. 3, 1987); Toyota of
San Francisco, 280 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 124 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1986); Superior Fast Freight, 275 N.L.R.B. 329 (1985).
343. See Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1048 (April 9, 1986).
344. 276 N.L.R.B. 963 (1985).
345. Id. at 965 (footnote omitted).
346. 269 N.L.R.B. 150 (1984) (involving a merger of two labor organizations).
347. 274 N.L.R.B. 491 (1985) (involving a question of the unit affiliation of employees transferred from a defunct
to an existing plant).
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In the post-settlement cases, the Board has also manifested a concern about
whether the parties' grievance procedure was capable of fairly resolving the dispute.
For example, the Board refused to defer in Cotter & Co. ,348 because the contract had
no provision covering the dispute; in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. ,349 because the
arbitrator did not adequately consider the unfair labor practice; and in Drummond
Coal Co.,350 because the arbitrator denied the grievance on procedural grounds rather
than on the merits.
When the Board has deferred, its decisions represent a proper sensitivity to the
administrative restraint contemplated by the statute, once collective bargaining
agreements have been reached. For example, cases after Olin indicate that there are
three alternative bases for avoiding a finding of repugnancy: (1) if the arbitrator's
analytical approach is generally consistent with the Board's; 35' (2) if the arbitrator
relies on the kinds of factors deemed consistent with labor-management practice;352
or (3) if the ruling is consistent with Board precedent. 353 This "repugnancy"
determination is based on the record findings of the arbitrator unless there are clear
factual errors. 354 Similarly, if arbitral remedies are based on factors that are not
inconsistent with the Act, the Board will not find an award repugnant simply because
the arbitral remedy differs from remedies the Board has given in similar cases. 355 The
Board recognizes the "flexibility of remedies [as] a major advantage of arbitra-
tion. '"356 The Board also recognizes that pre-award settlements do not differ
significantly from actual arbitration awards. As a result, the Board defers to such
settlements under Olin.357
Moreover, the General Counsel cannot meet the burden of proving that the
arbitrator has not adequately considered the unfair labor practice issue simply by
showing that the decision reflects no consideration of the unfair labor practice issue
348. 276 N.L.R.B. 714 (1985).
349. 277 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1101 (Dec. 31, 1985).
350. 277 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1140 (Jan. 13, 1986).
351. See Ohio Edison Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 874 (1985) (upholding the suspension of two employees who honored a
stranger picket line in the face of a clause that prohibited "cessation of any work of the Company." The Board held that
the award was not clearly repugnant since the arbitration panel interpreted the waiver issue based on the no-strike clause-
an approach consistent with the Board's, there was no showing that the panel decision was not "motivated by
considerations irrelevant to labor-management relations," and the award was "not in conflict with the purposes and
policies of the Act."); Altoona Hospital, 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984) (when employee was discharged for giving
confidential information to a private investigator, retained by the employee to investigate a grievance against the
employer, the Board deferred to the arbitrator's award denying the grievance because the arbitrator balanced the legitimate
interests of the employer in confidentiality against the protected right of the employee to process a grievance). Accord
Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1985); United States Postal Serv., 275 N.L.R.B. 430 (1985).
352. See Ohio Edison Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 874 (1985).
353. The Board will make every attempt to reconcile the arbitral award with statutory interpretation. See, e.g.,
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 396 (1985).
354. See Louis G. Freeman Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 80 (1984).
355. See Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1984). Cf. Earl C. Smith, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 121
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1255 (Feb. 21, 1986) (the Board deemed repugnant an award that did not attempt to remedy a
contractual breach that was also an unfair labor practice).
356. See Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 217 n.l1 (1985).
357. See Griffith-Hope Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 487 (1985); Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1985) (applying the
Spielberg "fairness" standard by considering whether: each party made concessions; any coercion was present; attention
is paid to whether the parties actually agreed; and the agreement resolved all the issues).
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or by showing that there is no decision. 358 Under Olin's burden of proof rule, the
General Counsel loses in those cases.
In determining whether the arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor
practice, the Board has made it clear that it will exercise only limited review. It will
not require the arbitrator to make a specific finding that contractual and statutory
issues are parallel, 35 9 nor will it require her to have authority under the contract to
decide the unfair labor practice issue. 36° The Board only requires that the arbitrator
be given a general factual presentation relating to the unfair labor practice
issue. 361
These cases reveal that the Board's approach has been consistent with and
faithfully reflects the general theory of deferral set forth in section II of this Article.
The Board has not deferred when the central focus of its jurisdiction was implicated
or when the collective bargaining process was threatened. Nor has it deferred when
the contractual procedure was incapable of resolving the entire dispute. The Board
has deferred, however, in cases in which collective bargaining appeared capable of
resolving fairly the unfair labor practice. It has also deferred to awards and
settlements, produced by fair procedures and contractual provisions, that encompass
the unfair labor practice issue and generate enough evidence to permit adequate
consideration of unfair labor practice concerns.
C. Disturbing Anomalies
Although the dominant tendency in Board deferral decisions since Olin and
United Technologies has been consistent with the general theory of deferral
developed in this Article, a few decisions raise questions as to whether the Board
clearly perceives this general theory. In Sachs Electric Co. ,362 for example, the Board
deferred to an arbitration award, finding that the contractual and statutory claims were
factually parallel even though the contractual claim was narrower than the statutory
claim. 363 This decision does not appear to be consistent with the general rule that the
358. See Ryder Truck Lines, 273 N.L.R.B. 713 (1984); Yellow Freight Sys., 273 N.L.R.B. 44 (1984). See also
Martin Redi-Mix, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 559, 560 (1985) (emphasis in original)("[T]he arbitrator's factual findings are not
equivalent to what record evidence actually was submitted to the arbitrator. Thus, it is not necessary for the arbitrator to
recite evidence in a written decision." The General Counsel, therefore, must prove that facts were not presented to the
arbitrator at some time during the proceeding.).
359. See Martin Redi-Mix, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 559 (1985).
360. See Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Bd., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1050 (Dec. 17,
1985).
361. See Martin Redi-Mix, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 559 (1985).
362. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269 (Feb. 28, 1986).
363. Id. The employee, Verlin, was a vocal union advocate who was laid off February 3, 1984. The union filed a
grievance on February 7, alleging that he had been improperly laid off in light of a contract provision calling for a union
steward to be the last person laid off and not to be discriminated against. The grievance before the arbitration committee
alleged that Verlin's lay off was improper because it resulted from his complaints as a steward about the improper
assignment of overtime. Since the evidence did not establish that Verlin was a union steward, the arbitration committee
denied the grievance. The committee did not address the discrimination against Verlin based on his complaints as an
employee, since only a violation of the provision protecting union stewards and not the "just cause" provision was
alleged.
The Board majority found factual parallelism: the conduct that Verlin allegedly engaged in as a union steward was
the same conduct that Verlin engaged in as an employee. Thus, the arbitrator, as well as the Board, would have to consider
whether Verlin engaged in the conduct, whether he did so in furtherance of the contract, and whether his advocacy, rather
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Board should defer only when the contractual claim is of sufficient scope to also
dispose of the unfair labor practice issue. 364 As the Board has recognized in
pre-settlement and other post-settlement cases, collective bargaining is not encour-
aged and the parties are disserved if the Board credits the grievance procedures with
a settlement that is beyond its scope. 365 Under the general theory, in a case like
Sachs, the Board's supervisory role is triggered, since collective bargaining is
incapable of producing a satisfactory result and the Board cannot permit conduct
raising statutory concerns to go unaddressed.
The Board generally has been careful not to defer in pre- and post-settlement
cases in which the charge presents a representation question. 366 Because representa-
tion issues are central to an employee's right to choose between collective and
individual bargaining systems, the Board has properly treated representation cases as
nondeferrable. 367 But recently, in Hospital Employees,3 68 the Board refused to defer
to an arbitrator's finding of majority status, when the arbitrator had credited
authorization cards that had been tainted by supervisory solicitation. Agreeing with
the ALJ, the Board found that the award was repugnant to the Act. 369 While the
ultimate holding is consistent with the general theory, the Board's reasoning in
Hospital Employees may create future problems because it obscures the line between
cases in which the Board's role is central and those in which it is merely supervisory.
Equally important, the Hospital Employees rationale undermines the Board's primary
responsibility in representation cases by purporting to apply the lenient "repug-
nancy" standard in such cases. Since the Board's role in representation cases is
primary and not merely supervisory, the Board should have rejected the arbitrator's
award as nondeferrable rather than merely "repugnant" to the Act.
Another anomaly is raised by what may have been a mere overstatement of the
Board's position in Anderson Sand & Gravel.370 In reviewing the "repugnancy"
argument made by the General Counsel, the Board said:
Because the General Counsel and the judge would have decided the contractual issues
in this case differently than the arbitration panel, they argue that deferral is inappropriate. As
we have repeatedly stated since our decision in Olin, the Board's standard of review does not
than some legitimate business reason, accounted for his lay off. Yet the majority failed to appreciate the pivotal
distinctions that the contract only protected stewards against lay offs and that the arbitration panel was only authorized
to consider whether Verlin was entitled to the protection of that provision. See also Sachs Elec. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No.
121, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269, 1271 (Feb. 28, 1986) (Dennis, Mem., dissenting in part) (the contractual and statutory
issues were not factually parallel).
364. The typical example is a "just cause" provision that is broad enough to cover allegations of discharge for
statutorily protected activity. See, e.g., Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 270 N.L.R.B. 1219 (1984).
365. See, e.g., Cotter & Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 714 (1985) (adopting the AL's finding that the contractual issue,
decided by the arbitrator, was narrower than the statutory issue presented to the Board and, thus, deferral was improper);
IBEW Local 1316, 271 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984) (adopting the ALU's refusal to defer the unfair labor practice issue to
grievance-arbitration procedures because the contract contained no provision under which the issue could be considered).
366. See supra notes 318, 336 (citing cases in which the Board denied deferral of representation issues).
367. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Chems., 270 N.L.R.B. 821 (1984); Port Chester Nursing Home, 269 N.L.R.B. 150
(1984).
368. 275 N.L.R.B. 272 (1985).
369. The AL based this finding of repugnancy on the fact that the arbitrator ignor[ed] Board precedent in making
his award." Id. at 274-75. Using the language of Olin, the Board said that "the arbitratorl's] award [was] palpably wrong
and not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act."Id. at 272.
370. 277 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069 (Dec. 23, 1985).
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contemplate that the Board will substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator in resolving
contractual issues. Rather, we will inquire only into whether the arbitrator adequately
considered the unfair labor practice issues, which, in this case, we have concluded was
satisfactorily done. 371
This suggests that the Board will review only the scope of arbitration and will not
review the substance of the award under the "repugnancy" test, thus melding the
Spielberg requirement of repugnancy with the separate Raytheon-Monsanto require-
ment of adequate consideration. Such an approach would inappropriately condone
awards that threaten the collective bargaining process in cases in which the unfair
labor practice issues were considered. 372
The Board has not yet withheld deference solely on the ground that an award or
settlement has not been fair or regular.3 73 In Browne374 the Board indicated that it
would not scrutinize closely the quality of union representation at a grievant's
hearing. As demonstrated in section IV(B), 375 this reluctance undermines both the
fair representation premise of collective bargaining and the foundation of deferral as
explained by the general theory. 376
371. Id. at 1070.
372. See, e.g., Garland Coal & Mining Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 963 (1985).
373. The Board considered and rejected such an argument in United Parcel Serv., 270 N.L.R.B. 290 (1984).
374. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121 (Jan. 13, 1986), rev'd, Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1986). This case is also referred to as Bailey Distributors.
375. See infra notes 396-429 and accompanying text.
376. Judicial review of Board deferral decisions is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion under the
statute. See Lewis v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. UAW Local 1131,777 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1985);
NLRB v. Iron Workers Local 433, 767 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1985). Since the Act gives the Board the authority both to
defer and not to defer, the specific issues on review are whether the Board has departed from its own deferral standards
and whether such standards are invalid.See NLRB v. Iron Workers Local 433, 767 F.2d 1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1985).
In the three cases involving deferral to grievance-arbitration procedures decided since United Technologies, the
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have upheld the Board's decisions as within the proper exercise of its discretion. In each
case, the court held that the Board's decision was consistent with precedent and advanced the policies of the Act. See
NLRB v. UAW Local 1131, 777 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1985) (involving a superseniority provision that was unlawful on
its face); Lewis v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1986) (involving a suspension and termination); NLRB v. Iron Workers
Local 433, 767 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (when an employee claimed the union improperly operated a hiring hall, the
Board refused to defer due to the union's conflict of interest with the employee).
Five circuits have considered Board deferral decisions in light of the Olin standards. See Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d
1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (questioning whether the Board's deferral to an arbitral award of reinstatement without backpay
was based on a collateral estoppel, limited review, pivotal contractual interpretation, or waiver theory, and concluding that
the Board's deferral decision was an admixture of all four); Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986) (vacating the
Board's deferral order, holding that the Board had abused its discretion by erroneously finding parallelism between
contractual and statutory issues and sufficient evidence on the statutory issue); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (1 th Cir.
1986) ("If [the Multi-State Committee hearing] had produced a dispositive result [with respect to the statutory issue], then
deferral to that result would have been proper under any of the many variations of the Spielberg standard."); Lewis v.
NLRB, 779 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the unfair labor practice issue must be reflected in a
written award in order to be deemed adequately considered by the arbitrator); NLRB v. IBEW Local 11, 772 F.2d 571
(9th Cir. 1985) (upholding the Board's refusal to defer because of the union's conflict of interest with employees attacking
the union's hiring hall procedures); Bakery Workers v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding the Board's
deferral to an arbitrator's award that interpreted the employer's alleged unilateral change as authorized by the contract).
While the Taylor decision attacked Olin from a number of angles, the specific objection was that the evidence did
not indicate that any facts relevant to the unfair labor practice were considered by the arbitration panel:
This case does not present the court with the question of whether the facts and issues were sufficiently parallel
to justify deferral, nor does it involve scrutinizing an arbitral finding for a result that is "clearly repugnant" to
the Act. The overriding question in this case is whether the Area Committee ever considered any facts relevant
to Taylor's statutory claim.
Taylor v. N.L.R.B., 786 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986).
This statement of the issue is disturbing in that the Board overruled the ALI in part because he had partitioned the
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IV. TOWARD UNIFORMITY AND FAIRNESS
A. Toward a Unitary View of Deferral
Historically, the Board has bifurcated the deferral discussion into two principal
parts: pre-settlement and post-settlement deferral. Post-settlement deferral first
emerged with a set of governing standards in Spielberg.377 Pre-settlement deferral
followed later with a set of determining factors in Collyer.3 78 The Collyer majority
saw the connection between pre- and post-settlement deferral and refused to presume
that the untested grievance procedure would not meet Spielberg standards.3 79 The
extension of Collyer to individual rights cases in National Radio380 was based on "the
multi-layered arbitration proceeding in determining whether sufficient evidence on the unfair labor practice issue had been
presented. The facts indicated that the Multi-State Committee had clearly considered the unfair labor practice issues as
reflected in the minutes of the proceeding. When the Multi-State Committee could not decide the issue, the case was
automatically forwarded to the Southern Area Grievance Committee, which then adopted the minutes of the Multi-State
Committee, heard from the company but not from the employee or the union, and denied the grievance. The AIU found
that the area committee minutes did not show that the unfair labor practice issue had been considered. The AL's approach
was identical to that followed by the court in Taylor. If the court is willing to bifurcate the arbitration and to ignore one
part of it in determining whether deferral was proper, will it ever defer to pre-arbitral settlements when evidence on what
the parties considered may be totally lacking? The core issue in Taylor was whether the Board could properly require the
party seeking a de novo trial to prove that the arbitrator considered facts relevant to the unfair labor practice issue. The
court argued that Olin's shifting of the proof burden returns the Board to the presumption created in Electronic
Reproduction.
Not only is this characterization of the effect of Olin incorrect, but the pro-deferral policy aided by Olin's allocation
of burdens is fully consistent with the purposes of the Act. In Electronic Reproduction, the Board's ruling created a
presumption that matters integral to the unfair labor practice issue had been considered simply because the parties could
have raised the issue. If they had not actually raised the issue deferral would not have been defeated under the rule. Thus,
unfair labor practice concerns were permitted to go completely unconsidered. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the
numerous cases decided by the Board since Olin, the two-pronged test of Olin insures that unfair labor practice facts will
be considered and the dispute resolved consistently with the Act. The placement of the proof burden merely affirms the
primacy of certain values. When the Board's preference was for assuming jurisdiction and against private settlement, the
placement of the burden of proof on the party seeking deferral also reflected that policy judgment. The current Board
preference for private settlement more faithfully fulfills the Board's normative role under the Act.
The Taylor court argued that Spielberg's "fair and regular" standard is not satisfied in the context of Teamster
Grievance Committee hearings. As indicia of unfairness the court pointed to truncated hearings and procedural rights,
weak or nonexistent evidence, inconvenient hearing sites, nonparticipation of grievants, and inadequate consideration of
all relevant facts. See also Summers, The Teamster Grievance Committees: Grievance Disposal Without Adjudication, 37
PRoc. or NAT'L AcA. Aim. 130 (1984). The court failed to perceive that the new standards announced in Olin have no
bearing on the separate question of whether the proceedings have been fair and regular. Even if the area committee in
Taylor had explicitly considered and resolved the unfair labor practice issue in a written decision, the proceedings may
have been unfair and irregular, thus failing the first SpielberglOlin test. The fairness inquiry is concerned with whether
the integrity of the grievance-arbitration procedure warrants Board refusal to assert jurisdiction. Teamster Grievance
Committee proceedings may well violate fairness standards, and the court's treatment of that issue reminds the Board of
a test that it has infrequently applied. This Article proposes specific content for the SpielberglOlin fairness standard. See
infra notes 396-429 and accompanying text. The issue of whether the unfair labor practice issue has been adequately
considered, however, addresses the scope of the grievance-arbitration procedure to resolve the dispute. Finally, in
mistakenly equating the effect of Olin with the presumption created by Electronic Reproduction, the Eleventh Circuit cited
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981), and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), as requiring both that the Board hear statutory
claims and that Olin standards be overturned. On the contrary, these decisions suggest an affirmation of Olin. See supra
notes 207-45 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
379. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839-43 (1971).
380. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
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reasonableness of the assumption that the arbitration procedure [would] resolve [the]
dispute in a manner consistent with the standards of Spielberg.'"381
The pre-settlement and post-settlement deferral questions are only slightly
different. Before the collective bargaining process has fully vented the issues, the
question is whether the grievance-arbitration procedure is capable of fairly resolving
the dispute's unfair labor practice aspects. After the procedure has run its course, the
question is whether the process has settled the unfair labor practice issues fairly.
Pre-settlement deferral cases question the procedure's potential; post-settlement cases
question its performance.
Deferral standards should reflect this slight variation and also permit a uniform
approach to deferral questions. Though the Board's CollyerlUnited Technologies
factors382 and Spielberg/Olin criteria 38 3 share much in common, Board decisions
show no consciousness of the near identity of the two inquiries. In some cases, the
Board interchanges the announced factors and criteria without explicitly making the
connection. 384
Under Collyer/United Technologies, in order to determine whether the grievance
procedure is capable of resolving the dispute's unfair labor practice issues, the Board
considers the stability of the collective bargaining relationship, 385 the respondent's
willingness to use the contractual procedure, 386 the likelihood that individual interests
would be defended fairly during the process, 387 and the scope of the grievance
procedure and its ability to encompass the unfair labor practice dimensions of the
dispute. 388 In reviewing the procedure's actual performance in accordance with
Spielberg and Olin, the Board similarly addresses the finality, fairness, and scope of
the settlement.389 Moreover, under the Olin two-part test for adequate consideration,
both the breadth of contractual provisions and the evidence actually presented to the
arbitrator define the scope of the proceedings. 390
Since post-settlement review is concerned with the actual performance of the
settlement process, the Board generally considers the actual result produced by the
procedure and looks for "repugnancy." But even this aspect of the deferral analysis
is not peculiar to post-settlement review, for when contractual provisions make a
381. Id. at 531.
382. See supra notes 121-30, 142-45 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 85-94, 108-11 and accompanying text.
384. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 187 (1984) (disallowing the grievant to withdraw from the
grievance-arbitration procedure after it had started, but suggesting that some other showing may have been sufficient to
overcome deferral, such as a reason to believe that arbitration would not have been fair and regular or some indication
that the procedure would produce repugnant results). See also United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 278 N.L.R.B. No.
21, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1031 (Jan. 21, 1986) (deferring, in part because the contractual and statutory issues %ere
factually parallel).
385. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971) (the length of the relationship); Rappazzo
Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299 (Sept. 16, 1986) (whether the employer has shown a
hostility to collective bargaining and the exercise of individual rights).
386. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971).
387. See, e.g., id. at 843.
388. See, e.g., id. at 841-42.
389. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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repugnant result unavoidable, pre-settlement deferral is inappropriate. 39' The Board
has also suggested that any showing that the procedure would produce repugnant
results would be sufficient grounds for nondeferral. 392
The Board could take a major step toward clarifying deferral standards by
recognizing that the fairness, scope, and finality standards are identical benchmarks
in both the pre- and post-settlement contexts. They are simply used differently,
depending on when the deferral question is raised. Before the procedure is used, the
standards help the Board predict the procedure's effectiveness. After the procedure
has been used, they facilitate the Board's review of its effectiveness. When the
contract facially permits the Board to predict the results of arbitration, repugnancy
may also be ascertained a priori. 393
Only the stability issue is uniquely dependent upon when the deferral question
is raised. It is relevant only when the prospective use of the grievance procedure is
questioned. If the newness of the parties' relationship or if the employer's conduct
creates an unacceptable risk of unfair resolution, the procedure is unlikely to work
and the Board will not defer. Once settlement has been achieved, instability is only
important if it has affected the fairness and regularity of the proceeding.
This uniform view of the deferral question would help the Board avoid the kind
of analytical mistake made in Sachs Electric Co. 39 4 There, the Board found the
contractual and statutory issues to be factually parallel, even though the contractual
issue was narrower than the statutory issue. The arbitrator only considered whether
the grievant was entitled to lay off protection as a union steward and not the broader
question of whether his lay off constituted "discipline" without just cause. 395 While
the typical "just cause" provision is coextensive with subsection 8(a)(1) and (a)(3)
claims, arbitrators are not likely to consider unlawful motivation in the context of
narrower contractual claims. The Board might have avoided its improper holding in
Sachs Electric by asking whether it would have deferred prospectively in that case.
Since the scope of the contractual provision was too narrow to encompass the unfair
labor practice issue, it would have denied deferral under CollyerlUnited Technolo-
gies. The same result is appropriate on post-award review and would have been
forthcoming under a uniform approach to deferral.
B. Deferral and Fairness
Post-settlement review of grievance arbitration is the crucial aspect of the
Board's deferral oversight. It justifies pre-settlement deferral, 396 and it fends off the
391. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 208, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1276 (Feb. 21, 1986);
UAW Local 1161, 271 N.L.R.B. 1411 (1984) (discussing the arbitrator's unhelpful role both as a limitation on the scope
of the arbitrator's authority and as a threshold question that the Board could not defer).
392. See General Dynamics Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 187 (1984).
393. See, e.g., Rappazzo Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299 (Sept. 16, 1986).
394. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269 (Feb. 28, 1986).
395. Id.
396. See Lewis v. N.L.R.B., 800 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1986); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 531 (1972);
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971).
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"abdication" arguments of critics. 397 If grievance arbitration can demonstrate
competence to dispose of statutory issues when the parties submit to the process
before commencing a Board action, it is difficult to argue against the pre-settlement
postponement of Board action. If the Board's review of the settlement is careful, the
"abdication" argument is without merit, since the Board continues adequately to
supervise the contractual process. 398
Understanding its supervisory role, the Board readily exercises jurisdiction when
the grievance procedure is incapable of resolving the unfair labor practice aspects of
the dispute. For the same reason, the Board must closely scrutinize both the process
and its result. The "repugnancy" standard assures proper review of the result and the
Board's new Olin standards guarantee arbitration's adequate consideration of the
unfair labor practice issue.
Whether the conduct of the proceeding has been conducive to a fair result
depends on the "fairness and regularity" of the proceeding. Regularity is easily met
by affording the grievant basic due process and confrontational rights as well as an
impartial decision maker. 399 The assurance of fairness will depend upon the degree
to which the Board is willing to examine the proceeding under the Olin fairness
standard.
In Bailey Distributors,4° an ALJ refused to defer to an arbitrator's award,
noting that the proceeding before the arbitrator had not been fair and regular. The
grievant had retained private counsel to help him establish that he had been
constructively discharged and unjustly deprived of contractual benefits, and there-
fore, was entitled to reinstatement and back pay. Although an arbitrator held that the
employee was not covered by the contract, the ALJ found that the union's interests
conflicted with the employee's. There was evidence that the union had not enforced
the contract as to the grievant, that the grievant had sued the union because it made
no effort to cure breaches relating to the grievant, and that there was animosity
between union counsel and the attorney representing the grievant. The ALJ also
concluded that the union had not effectively represented the grievant at the arbitration
proceeding. In a decision that seems justified by the facts, the Board reversed the
ALJ's findings on the "fairness" issue, citing countervailing evidence that the
potential conflicts between union and grievant counsel had not affected the fairness
397. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 577 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting in part); United Technologies
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 561 (1984) (Zimmerman, Mem., dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 531
(1972) (Fannings& Jenkins, Mems., dissenting); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 850 (1971) (Jenkins, Mem.,
dissenting); General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977) (Murphy, Chr., concurring); Moses, supra note 150.
398. While the General Counsel and her designees attempt to implement Board policy uniformly throughout the
agency, commentators have noted that much of this review occurs at the regional level. See Morris, supra note 150, at
304-05; Shank, supra note 150, at 240-42.
399. Pre-Olin cases indicate that the Board will look to a variety of factors in assessing the regularity of the
proceeding. See Versi Craft Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1975) (opportunity for direct and cross examination); Associated
Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1972) (record of the proceeding, representation); Roadway Express Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513
(1963) (arbitral impartiality); Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962) (adequate notice of hearing and
opportunity to prepare). But see United Parcel Serv., 270 N.L.R.B. 290 (1984); United Parcel Serv., 232 N.L.R.B. 1114
(1977) (impartiality is not necessarily diminished because the arbitration panel is without a neutral party).
400. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121 (Jan. 21, 1986), rev'd, Nevins v. N.L.R.B., 796 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1986).
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of the hearing. 4°0 Regarding the quality of the union's representation of the grievant
at arbitration, however, the Board sounded the following disturbing note:
Regarding the judge's conclusion that the Union did not effectively present Nevins'
case to the arbitrator .... we will not grant a trial de novo. We will not examine the
arbitration proceedings from the perspective of whether the case could have been presented
before the arbitrator more effectively, more persuasively, or in a more logical manner. We
will not refuse to defer to an arbitration award because an argument can be made, with the
benefit of hindsight, that a more effective presentation might have changed the arbitrator's
decision. 402
While this statement does not disavow a willingness to apply basic standards of
fairness, its tone reveals an unpredictable degree of resistance to the review of
arbitration proceedings. 4° 3 In view of the fair representation premise of collective
bargaining, 4° 4 the posture taken by the Board in Bailey Distributors would undermine
the foundation of deferral as explained by the general theory. If the Board routinely
deferred to awards of questionable fairness, it would also give credence to the critics'
cries of "abdication" and reverse the progressive direction of the Board's deferral
policy. 40 5
"Fairness" is an amorphous concept that can be difficult to apply. 40 6 Some of
the most concrete "fairness" guidelines can be gleaned from cases addressing the
union's duty of fair representation (DFR). Although recognized as more demand-
ing,407 standards developed under this duty are uniquely transferable to the fairness
category of Spielberg and Olin.408 The union's authority to bargain on behalf of
individual employees, whose individual rights and interests may be compromised in
the process, is conditioned upon the union's DFR. 4° 9 This duty protects the individual
in the collective system.4t0 Collective bargaining will produce the individual
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1124.
403. In earlier cases the Board did indicate a willingness to inquire as to the quality of representation under the
"fairness" rubric. See, e.g., Mason & Dixon Lines Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 6 (1978).
404. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
405. A recurring criticism of deferral is that unions may half-heartedly process employee grievances without
violating their duty of fair representation, thereby depriving employees of statutory protection. See, e.g., Moses, supra
note 150, at 229.
406. See Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MNN. L. REv. 183 (1980); Freed, Polsby
& Spitzer, Union, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Bargaining, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 465 (1983); Hyde, Can
Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?: A Comment on Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 415 (1984);
Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, A Reptv to Hyde, Can Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 425
(1984); Harper & Lupu, supra note 247.
407. See Schatzki, supra note 106, at 910.
408. Cf. Harper & Lupu, supra note 247, at 1281-82 n.290 in which it is stated:
The threat that this deferral policy poses to employees' control over the union that represents their interests in
arbitration should not, however, be met by tightening DFR review. It should be met directly by restricting the
Board's authority to defer to contractual arbitration when it is charged that an employer or a union has interfered
with an employee's right to choose or influence her collective bargaining representative.
This Article does not propose tightening DFR review, rather, it proposes tightening fairness review under Spielberg
and Olin, with the aid of DFR standards.
409. See Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1975);
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323
U.S. 192 (1944).
410. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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employee benefits contemplated by the statute only if unions do their jobs fairly and
in the best interests of all employees. Particularly in cases involving individual rights,
it is appropriate for the Board to require that DFR standards be satisfied before it
approves the settlement.
DFR standards do not require the degree of scrutiny rejected by the Board in
Bailey Distributors.4 ' Federal circuit courts disagree over how much scrutiny should
be given to union representation during arbitration proceedings. 41 2 The Supreme
Court's only guidance has come in Vaca v. Sipes4 13 and Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight.414 In Vaca, the Court held that a union could properly settle a grievance short
of arbitration and defined the DFR as barring arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith
conduct, as well as the perfunctory processing of meritorious grievances. 415 Hines
held that the duty could be breached when the union's quality of representation was
unacceptable, even though an arbitration award had issued. 416 The Court deemed the
union's failure to adequately investigate the case and to present exculpatory evidence
at arbitration as sufficient to raise a question of bad faith performance under the Vaca
standards.
The Seventh Circuit has held that the DFR may only be breached by intentional
union misconduct. 417 The First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
a breach must occur with "nothing less than demonstrated reckless disregard.''418
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held unions liable for the negligent failure
to perform ministerial acts. 419 Notably, the NLRB requires something more than
mere negligence, that is, something rising to purposeful or willful misconduct. 420
Resolution of the debate over the appropriate standard is not necessary for the
Board to gain useful insights into post-award review of arbitral fairness. Courts
adopting standards more lenient than negligence worry about supervising the
collective bargaining process too closely. 421 In this context, the sole function of
courts in furthering national labor policy is to enforce collective bargaining
411. See supra note 400-02 and accompanying text. Even though this discussion focuses on the quality of union
representation during arbitration, it is also relevant to grievance settlements achieved before those cases reach arbitration.
412. See infra notes 417-20 and accompanying text. See generally Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representa-
tion: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L. REv. 35.
413. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
414. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
415. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967).
416. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1975).
417. See Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1986) (the following reasons were given
for rejecting a causation standard: (1) The courts would become too embroiled in deciding the merits of disputes, which
is against the national policy of private settlement; (2) a causation or negligence standard "would interfere with
employees' right to choose the level of care for which they are willing to pay"; (3) employee control over how contentious
they want to be and how much of their resources should be spent on grievance processing would be interfered with; and
(4) the employer would be shielded from the "risk of error" in relying upon the union's performance in arbitration).
418. See Earley v. Eastern Transfer, 699 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1983); Grovnor v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 625 F.2d 1289
(5th Cir. 1980); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668
F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1982).
419. See Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523
F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d
710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
420. See Local 1310 Painters & Allied Trades, 270 N.L.R.B. 560 (1984); Union of Security Personnel, 267
N.L.R.B. 974 (1983); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1983).
421. See, e.g., Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1986).
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agreements. Yet the Board serves the distinct function of preventing unfair labor
practices, and therefore must supervise more closely the performance of the collective
bargaining process in determining the propriety of post-settlement deferral. Thus, the
Board's reviewing of the fairness of the arbitral process calls for the closer scrutiny
promoted by the "reasonable care" standard.
Cases addressing the union's DFR in preparing and conducting arbitration are
most relevant to post-award review of arbitral fairness. In Milstead v. Teamsters
Local 957,422 the union breached its DFR because it failed to notice and argue a
missing contractual provision that would have sustained the grievance. Fairness
similarly requires that a union raise the contractual claim deemed factually parallel
under Olin.423 Using this guideline, the Board's holding in Sachs Electric would have
been different. There, the union claimed in arbitration that the grievant's lay off was
improper, because he enjoyed superseniority as a union steward. The union did not
argue that grievant's discharge was without "just cause." The arbitrator held that the
grievant was not a union steward and consequently upheld the lay off. The Board
deferred even though the broader claim that the grievant's lay off was improperly
motivated was neither directly nor indirectly presented to nor decided by the
arbitrator. As discussed above,424 a unitary approach to this question would have
revealed that the statutory and contractual issues were not factually parallel.
Moreover, the union's failure to assert a protective contractual provision violates the
DFR under Milstead. The contractual claim that was not asserted supplies the basis
for an "adequate consideration" finding under Olin. Thus, the union's failure to
assert such a claim should also be deemed a breach of the "fairness" standard under
Spielberg and Olin.
Circuit courts have also held that the union breaches its DFR in presenting
grievances, when it fails to present evidence essential to sustaining the grievance.425
In some cases, the duty to present key evidence may require something more than
evidence generally relevant to the unfair labor practice issue. For example, assume
the grievant alleges that the company discharged him because of his protected
grievance filing activity, but the company claims the termination was based on poor
work performance. The union then presents a witness who testifies that the supervisor
"seemed" to have a more hateful attitude toward the grievant but fails to produce a
witness who would testify that the supervisor told him that grievant's grievance filing
activities would return to haunt him. While the evidence presented may meet the Olin
standard for "adequate consideration" of the unfair labor practice issue,426 the
422. 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978).
423. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). When contractual provisions specifically incorporate statutory
protections, the Olin standards may require the unfair labor practice claim to be submitted to the arbitrator and specific
evidence on that claim to be presented. See Superior Fast Freight, 225 N.L.R.B. 329 (1985).
424. See supra notes 377-95 and accompanying text.
425. See Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that the union's perfunctory reading
of a pro se grievance without showing that the employer did not issue a prerequisite warning and the failure to investigate
grievant's charges violated DFR); Baldini v. Local 1095 UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978) (the union failed to present
key witnesses in grievant's behalf).
426. See Martin Redi-Mix, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 559 (1985); Hilton Hotels Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 488 (1984);
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union's failure to produce essential evidence of an unfair labor practice would
nonetheless breach its DFR under a "reasonable care" standard. 427 Thus, the Board's
review of the proceeding for "fairness" should result in a decision not to
defer. 428
Finally, the "reasonable care" standard of representation would permit the
Board to adjust its degree of scrutiny depending on the nature of the settlement
procedures used to resolve the dispute. For example, settlements not involving a
neutral party may generally warrant closer scrutiny than conventional arbitration
proceedings. 42 9
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has articulated a theory of deferral that explains the circumstances
and reasons governing Board deferral to contractual grievance procedures. Recently,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a Board decision
deferring to an arbitrator's award. 430 In so doing, the court urged the Board to
articulate a "general theory of deference" 43' that would explain whether the Board
could properly defer to an arbitrator's award "that is doctrinally different from Board
precedent.' '432 In that case, the Board had deferred to an arbitrator's award that found
the employer had discharged a union steward in violation of both the contract and the
NLRA, but ordered a remedy of reinstatement without backpay. The arbitrator
withheld backpay because the employee had refused to leave the plant after the
incident leading to her discharge. The court initially objected to the Board's assertion
that the arbitrator's remedy was consistent with the Board's remedial approach.
While acknowledging that the Board previously had denied backpay to unlawfully
discharged employees who engaged in later misconduct, the court distinguished those
cases as denying both reinstatement and backpay. Had the arbitrator followed the rule
suggested by the court's distinction, the grievant would have received even less
protection than the arbitrator's award afforded.
Consolidated Freightways Corp. 257 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1981) (a pre-Olin case in which deferral was denied because of the
union's failure to offer evidence).
427. See Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1980); Baldini v. Local 1095 UAW, 581
F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1978).
428. The discussion in Bailey Distributors indicates that the Board recognizes in both the pre- and post-arbitral
setting the unfairness that can occur when the grievant's representative has interests adverse to the grievant's. Thus, Board
scrutiny of joint committee decisions should be particularly careful in light of the opportunity for collusion between
management and union representatives when the union considers the grievance "unmeritorious or undeserving." See
Rabin, Fair Representation in Arbitration, in THE CHNGrING LAW oF FAuR EnRsErr^noN 178-80 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985).
See also Summers, Measuring the Union's Duty to the Individual, in THE CHANGIo LAw o FAI REomEmrEAo.I 168-69
(J. McKelvey ed. 1985) (summarizing the concrete measures of the DFR in different categories of cases).
Under the approach proposed in this Article, there is no danger of proliferating DFR Board actions. First, the
standard proposed here--' 'reasonable care--is higher than that currently adopted by the Board. Thus, the failure to meet
the standard does not necessarily breach the duty as currently stated. Second, the "reasonable care" standard only
scrutinizes the representative's handling of the unfair labor practice issue, not the entire contractual claim. If the standard
is not met on the former, the Board simply refuses to defer and subsequently hears the dispute.
429. See Summers, supra note 60, at 151-52.
430. See Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d. 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
431. Id. at 1409.
432. Id. at 1408.
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Apparently the court was troubled by the Board's failure to explain its reasons
for deferral generally, and particularly in that case. In expressing the concern that the
Board clearly explain a general theory of deferral, the court identified four theories
that are interwoven throughout key deferral decisions: collateral estoppel, limited
scope of review, deference to contract interpretation, and waiver. Regarding the
Board's "admixture of theories" as unsatisfactory, the court returned the case to the
Board with instructions that deferral decisions be given a theoretical framework.
None of the labels suggested by the court adequately explains the principle of
deferral. As section II of the Article demonstrates, each of the four theories suggested
by the court provides some insight into the foundation of deferral, but none is
sufficient to fully explain the principle.
It is not surprising that Board deferral defies theoretical labeling. The Act is, at
best, ambivalent on this issue. The NLRA creates the right to engage in collective
bargaining and obligates the Board to insure that the right is protected. It expresses
a preference for private adjustment procedures and emphasizes the Board's authority
to prevent unfair labor practices, despite such private adjustment procedures. Perhaps
the best label for the relationship between the Board and contractual settlement
procedures is "overlapping jurisdiction." This notion suggests that both the Board
and the grievance system have exclusive jurisdiction in some cases and shared
jurisdiction in others. Cases involving the Board's central focus, such as represen-
tation cases, fall within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand,
contract interpretation cases not involving unfair labor practices fall within the
grievance procedure's exclusive jurisdiction. The Board and grievance procedure
share jurisdiction, for example, in cases involving unfair labor practices that can be
fairly resolved without encroaching upon the central concerns of the Board.
Given the recent spate of scholarly criticism relating to the Board's deferral
policy, the District of Columbia Circuit will certainly not be alone in insisting upon
a well-supported statement of deferral policy from the Board. This Article has
attempted to set forth the basis for such a statement.
1987]
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APPENDIX I
Pre-Settlement Deferral Cases Decided Since United Technologies
CASE
General Dynamics Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(5) disclosure of
information).
Wellman Thermal Sys.,
269 N.L.R.B. 159 (1984)
(exception to ALJ's supplemental
order resolving disputes
under Board settlement).
Manville Forest Prod. Corp.,
269 N.L.R.B. 390 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory suspension).
United States Postal Serv.,
270 N.L.R.B. 114 (1984) (§ 8(a)(1), (3) dis-
criminatory harassment and suspension).
Martin Marietta Chems.,
270 N.L.R.B. 821 (1984)
(unit clarification petition).
General Dynamics Corp.,
270 N.L.R.B. 829 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to supply
allegedly confidential information).
United States Postal Serv.,
270 N.L.R.B. 976 (1984) (§ 8(a)(1) threat).
United States Postal Serv.,
270 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1984) (§ 8(a)(5) refusal to
abide by prior grievance solution).
S.Q.I. Roofing, Inc.,
271 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(5) failure to notify
union of scheduling weekend




is a precondition of the






















fairness require that the
§ 8(a)(5) issue not be
separated from the
§ 8(a)(1), (3) issues in





271 N.L.R.B. 187 (1984) (§ 8(a)(3) discrimi-
natory suspension of union steward).
IBEW Local 1316,
271 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984)
(§ 8(b)(1)(B) trying, fining,
and suspending a supervisor).
International Harvester Co.,
271 N.L.R.B. 647 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(4) retaliation and § 8(a)(3)
more onerous working conditions).
Roadway Express, Inc.,
271 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1984) (§ 8(a)(1) threat-
ened suspension of strikers).
United States Postal Serv.,
271 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1984) (§ 8(a)(1) impres-
sion of surveillance and § 8(a)(5) unilateral
changes).
Local 1161, UAW,
271 N.L.R.B. 1411 (1984)
(§ 8(b)(2) unlawful superseniority
clause and § 8(b)(1)(A) attempt to enforce the
unlawful superseniority clause).
United Beef Co.,
272 N.L.R.B. 66 (1984) (§ 8(a)(1), (3) harass-
ment and discharge of union steward for griev-
ance filing).
Hendrickson Bros.,
272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for
protesting working conditions).
Commercial Cartage Co.,
273 N.L.R.B. 637 (1984) (§ 8(a)(5)
unilateral change).
United Food Management Serv., Inc.,
273 N.L.R.B. 1611 (1985) (§ 8(a)(1), (5) fail-
ure to inform new employees of the obligation




relating to the propriety
of union fines of supervi-
sors.
Not deferred. Section
8(a)(4) enforcement is non-
delegable and connected
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United States Postal Serv.,
273 N.L.R.B. 1746 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change
of grievance processing policy
without authorization or bargaining
and § 8(a)(1) threat to suspend).
Roadway Express Inc.,
274 N.L.R.B. 357 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(4) retaliatory discharge).
United Technologies Corp.,
274 N.L.R.B. 504
(§ 8(a)(1) rule barring
wearing of protest buttons,
§ 8(a)(3) unlawful disciplining
of employee for union steward
activity, and § 8(a)(5) refusal
to supply information for
grievance processing).
Local 702, IBEW,
274 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1985)
(§ 8(b)(1)(B) union discipline
of supervisor).
Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers,
275 N.L.R.B. 278 (1985)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) retaliation for filing unfair labor
practice charges).
Griffith-Hope Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 475 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) subcontracting without bargaining).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 693 (1985) (§ 8(a)(5) unilateral
change and direct dealing).
0. Voorhees Painting Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 779 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1), (5) failure to furnish
information and refusal to comply
with the contract).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,




8(a)(1) charge was not
deferred since no request












are submitted to an arbitra-
tor is inappropriate.
Not deferred.
Remand for hearing on
whether this issue is within













Spann Bldg. Maintenance Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 971 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for protesting
involuntary transfer).
Clinchfield Coal Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to furnish
information).
Victor Block, Inc.,
276 N.L.R.B. 676 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) failure to apply
terms of contract).
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural,
& Ornamental Iron Workers Local 587, 276
N.L.R.B. 748 (1985) (§ 8(b)(3)
refusal to bargain).
KCW Furniture Co.,
276 N.L.R.B. 957 (1985) (§ 8(a)(5) unilateral
changes leading to suspensions of two employ-
ees).
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
276 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) removal of scab notice from
company bulletin board).
Bradley Univ.,
276 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1985) (§ 8(a)(5) unilateral
change of lunch break practice).
United States Postal Serv.,
276 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1985)




277 N.L.R.B. No. 21,
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1253 (Oct. 31, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to furnish information







contract, refused to arbi-
trate dispute, and refused
to waive time limitations





agree to waive time












OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Hutchinson Fruit Co.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 54
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1258 (Nov. 15, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) insistence on tape recording of the
grievance meeting led to impasse).
Amoco Oil Co.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 3,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308
(Jan. 16, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(1) refusal of union representation
at disciplinary hearing).
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1031 (Jan. 21 1986) (§ 8(b)(3) refusal to bar-
gain).
Shopmen's Local 539,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 24,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1043
(Jan. 22, 1986)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) refusal to
honor resignation and
post-resignation attempts
to collect union dues).
Coalite, Inc.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 40,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1030
(Jan. 30, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral changes in insurance bene-
fits).
United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 88, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 122
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1055 (Jan. 31, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change).
Sheet Metal Workers Local 208,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 87,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1276
(Feb. 21, 1986)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) fining employees
for crossing the picket line after resigning).
Not deferred.















and employee are adverse.
Not deferred.
Untimely raised, since
raised for first time
in exceptions.
Deferred.
Not deferred. The Board
must decide the threshhold





Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp.,
279 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212
(Apr. 29, 1986) (§ 8(a)(4) retaliation).
Communications Workers,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 9,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1158
(May 30, 1986)
(§ 8(b)(3) unilateral refusal to comply to
contractual cost sharing provision).
Burroughs Interstate Servs.
Credit Union,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 34,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209
(June 10, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change in wage increases).
United States Postal Serv.,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 80,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1337
(June 24, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to supply information).
United States Postal Serv.,
281 N.L.R.B. No. 32,
123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1351
(Aug. 29, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) direct dealing and unilateral
grievance adjustment).
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
281 N.L.R.B. No. 69,
123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299
(Sept. 30, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory work assignments and
§ 8(a)(1) warning for protected activity).
Rappazzo Elec. Co.,
281 N.L.R.B. No. 75,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1299
(Sept. 16, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral

















for deferral did not
specifically encompass
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Santulli Mail Serv. Inc.,
281 N.L.R.B. No 153, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1158 (Oct. 17, 1986) (§ 8(a)(5) discontinuance
of contributions to union's health and
welfare fund).
Local 814,
281 N.L.R.B. No. 153,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1366
(Sept. 30, 1986)
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APPENDIX II
Post-Settlement Cases Decided Since Olin
CASE
Port Chester Nursing Home,
269 N.L.R.B. 150 (1984)
(§§ 8(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), (a)(2), (a)(3) unlawful
merger).
Manville Forest Prods. Corp.,
269 N.L.R.B. 390 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory suspension).
John Morrell & Co.,
270 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discharge for not instructing
co-workers to cease wildcat strike).
Pinkerton's, Inc.,
270 N.L.R.B. 27 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory refusal to recall).
Louis G. Freeman Co.,
270 N.L.R.B. 80 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory suspension).
United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
270 N.L.R.B. 290 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(1) discriminatory discharge).
Altoona Hospital,
270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) interference with statutory right to
pursue grievance).
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines,
270 N.L.R.B. 1219 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge).
Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change of attendance pol-
icy).
Hilton Hotels Corp.,
272 N.L.R.B. 488 (1984)












with the Court's interpreta-
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Badger Meter, Inc., Deferred.
272 N.L.R.B. 824 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral changes).
Yellow Freight Sys., Deferred.
273 N.L.R.B. 44 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge).
Ryder Truck Lines, Deferred.
273 N.L.R.B. 713 (1984)
(§ 8(a)(1) discriminatory discharge for failure
to drive unsafe truck).
District 1199E, Hosp. & Health Care Deferred.
Employees,
273 N.L.R.B. 1458 (1985)
(§ 8(b)(3) refusal to bargain).
Cone Mills Corp., Deferred.
273 N.L.R.B. 1515 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge and partial
remedy).
Shimazaki Corp., Deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 15 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1), (3) discriminatory discharge for pro-
tected activity).
United Parcel Serv., Inc., Deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 396 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge).
Paper Mfg. Co., Not deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 491 (1985) Raised question
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain) concerning representation
Martin Redi-Mix, Inc., Deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 559 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for protected activity).
United Parcel Serv., Inc., Deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 667 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for asserting right
grounded in contract).
Ohio Edison Co., Deferred.
274 N.L.R.B. 874 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) suspension for honoring picket line).
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West Penn Power Co.,
274 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) union officers received harsher pun-
ishment for failure to stop unlawful work stop-
page).
1115, Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees
Union, 275 N.L.R.B. 272 (1985)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) suit to enforce arbitrator's finding
of card majority and duty to recognize based on
tainted cards).
Superior Fast Freight,
275 N.L.R.B. 329 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge).
United States Postal Serv.,
275 N.L.R.B. 430 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) denial of rights).
Griffith-Hope Co.,
275 N.L.R.B. 487 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change of insurance cover-
age).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
275 N.L.R.B. 949 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge of sympathy
strikers).
Cotter & Co.,
276 N.L.R.B. 714 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3), (5) transfer
of facility without transferring
employees and change to
lease-driver arrangement).
A.N. Elec. Corp.,
276 N.L.R.B. 887 (1985)





seeks to achieve a prohib-
ited objective and lacks
a reasonable basis in fact
and in law.
Not deferred.







as to employees' rights
under the Act.
Not deferred.




between written and actual
settlements, and Davis-
Bacon liabilities and not
liabilities of unfair labor
practices were settled.
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Garland Coal & Mining Co.,
276 N.L.R.B. 963 (1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge).
Sawin & Co.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 44,
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1287
(Nov. 12, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) refusal to reinstate unfair labor prac-
tice strikers).
Liquid Carbonic Corp.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 91,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1116
(Nov. 26, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(5) subcontracting in violation of con-
tract).
Brewery Workers Joint Local
Exec. Bd., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 18,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1050
(Dec. 17, 1985)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) enforcement of unlawful
seniority provision).
Anderson Sand & Gravel Co.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 127,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069
(Dec. 23, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(3) discharge for unauthorized walkouts).
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 160,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1101
(Dec. 31, 1985)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for protected concerted
activity).
Drummond Coal Co.,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 177,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1140
(Jan. 13, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain over plant
closing decision and § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain
over plant closing effects).
Not deferred.
Repugnant, since
discharge of union presi-
dent was for activity in
support of a union's inter-

















278 N.L.R.B. No. 17,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121
(Jan. 21, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(3) discriminatory compensation and dis-
charge because of nonunion status).
Earl C. Smith, Inc.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 100,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1255
(Feb. 21, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change in wages).
Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 109,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264
(Feb. 25, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(3) discrimatory discharge).
Sachs Elec. Co.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 121,
121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269
(Feb. 28, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(1) discharge for protected activity).
Trustees of Columbia Univ.,
279 N.L.R.B. No. 19,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1009
(Mar. 31, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral change by discontinuing
the tuition exemption benefit).
Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc.,
279 N.L.R.B. No. 28,




279 N.L.R.B. No. 163,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1129
(May 30, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(3) dischargu for strike misconduct).
Armour & Co.,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 96,



















Olin test of adequate
consideration.
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(§ 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain and unilateral
change).
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
281 N.L.R.B. No. 69,
123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1342
(Sept. 10, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(1) warning for protected concerted ac-
tivity).
Toyota of San Francisco,
280 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1056
(June 24, 1986)
(§ 8(a)(5) unilateral changes to last contract
offer).
Aces Mechanical Corp.,
282 N.L.R.B. No. 137,
124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1145
(Feb. 3, 1987)
(§ 8(a)(3) refusal to reinstate union steward








Olin test of adequate
consideration.
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